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Abstract
In  this  dissertation  I  examine  the  relations  between  qualitative  and
quantitative aspects of perceptual experience. I do this by examining the
difficulties in delineating these concepts as discrete categories as they relate
to  apperception;  in  particular,  it  seems  that  contemporary  analytic
philosophy of mind, such as the theories of Chalmers and Nagel,  do not
provide  a  sufficient  framework  within  which  to  define  a  subjective,
qualitative  realm  of  experience  and  an  objective,  quantitative  realm.
Furthermore, there are antinomic tendencies in analytic philosophy which
appear to be insuperable without exceeding the ‘terms of engagement’ of
that philosophical tradition, such as the causal-closure principle. I argue
that the analytic tradition is unable to produce a suitable solution to the
problem  of  qualitative  experience.  I,  therefore,  suggest  that  an
understanding of the nature of the phenomenon can only be discovered in a
semiotic  method  derived  from  a  combination  of  phenomenological
philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis.
iii
I 
Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the way in which qualitative
experience is possible without recourse to dualistic or hermetic reasoning
that  would  contradict  much  established  scientific  understanding.  In  the
philosophy of mind, many of the principle arguments proffered to explain
the appearance of ‘quality’ in experience rely on sound reasoning, but have
contrapositions whose own reasoning is equally coherent. Those who have
attempted to circumvent these antinomic tendencies, as I will show in the
course of this dissertation, have done so principally by ignoring many of the
difficulties involved. I suggest, therefore, an approach involving the thought
of phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and social theory in order to escape the
antinomic  pendulum which  prevents  progress  in  the  field.  Ultimately,  I
intend to argue that empirical  philosophy can not  provide a satisfactory
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solution to the problem of qualitative experience, intimately related to the
problem of meaning.
The term ‘qualia’ in the title of this essay might present some degree of
confusion in respect of its normal use in philosophical discourse. In many
cases it is used as a technical term for the unqualified ‘quality’, or, ‘what it
is like’ to experience. Often associated with epiphenomenalists, and other
dualists of the substance or property variety, it is rejected, for instance, by
D. Dennett as an unnecessary explanatory complication.1 I do not propose to
focus  on  this  term  so  much  as  its  sense:  qualitative  perception.  In
particular,  how  does  qualitative  perception  relate  to  the  structures  of
conscious being, and, to what extent do the structures of conscious being
affect the way in which ‘quality’  is perceived? In this sense, by the word
‘qualia’ in the title I mean perceptual quality simpliciter and do not intend
to endorse any particular philosophical position or tradition on account of
my use of that term alone.
Even after hundreds of years of debate, when Descartes proposed the
separation  of  mind  and body  into  the  categories  of  res  extensa  and  res
cogitans, the dispute between dualists represented by Cartesian philosophy
1 Daniel Dennett, ‘Lovely and Suspect Qualities’, Philosophical Issues, 1 (1991), 37-43 (38-9); Frank 
Jackson, ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982), 127-137; Ned Block, ‘Are 
Absent Qualia Possible?’, The Philosophical Review, 82 (1980), 257-274.
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and monists continues. To a large degree this debate, as I will discuss in
chapter  two,  is  antinomic.  Neither  those  who  argue  for  the  notion  of
abstract qualities as real substance or properties of a distinct perceiver, nor
who argue for the reduction of mental events to physical brain-states are
able  to  produce  arguments  that  are  completely  and  satisfactorily
explanatory. If, for instance, a complete reduction, such as that for which J.
J. C. Smart argues, is granted, issues of the qualities of the phenomena and
their apparent irreducibility to physical quantities as D. Chalmers and T.
Nagel have noted will remain unresolved.2 The physical reduction answers
the question of cause in the sense of Newtonian mechanical causation, but it
can not, in principle, do other than leave unexplained or eliminate elements
which are not susceptible of that kind of causal explanation. On the other
hand, according to Jaegwon Kim in his essay ‘The myth of nonreductive
materialism’ the non-reductive methods of D. Davidson and H. Putnam lead
inevitably either  to  the  effective elimination of  mental  events or back to
some form of reduction.3
2 Thomas Nagel, ‘What is it like to be a Bat?’, The Philosophical Review, 83 (1974), 435-450; David 
Chalmers, ‘Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness’ in The Character of Consciousness, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195311105.001.0001/acprof-
9780195311105-chapter-1> [accessed Sept. 18 2017].
3 Jaegwon Kim, ‘The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism’ in Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 265-284.
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In chapter two, I will demonstrate the failings of these theories. It is the
contention of the present work that they have fundamentally misunderstood
the true nature of the debate. By characterizing it as a dispute between a
‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ world-view, as J. Searle also points out, even
materialists have essentially adopted Cartesian categories of thought. But
more  than  that,  they  have  treated  the  issue  as  if  there  were  already
established an ‘objective’  reality over and above the ‘subjective’ reality of
mental events/properties/substances. I argue that this is the crucial mistake
made  especially  by  Nagel  and  Chalmers  regarding  their  arguments  in
favour  of  irreducible  ‘quality’;  there  is  no  ‘easy’  and  ‘hard’  problem  viz.
Chalmers’ paper ‘Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness’, there is only
experience and the attempt to explain what is gathered through experience
in a consistent and coherent way. 
I suggest instead that the only way forward in the debate is to cease the
attempt to reconcile mental events to a particular kind of interpretation of
the ‘physical’ sciences. Whilst it is clearly possible to discover in the physical
brain  electro-magnetic  and  physico-chemical  stimuli  which  correlate
regularly with certain physical, emotional, or other reactive phenomena, it
does not follow that experience is reducible to brain-content alone or to a
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literal  correspondence  between  external  stimuli  and  internal  physico-
chemical  responses.  In  cases  such  as  links  between  serotonin  and
depression, for example, while the reasoning of the scientist is coherent in
its  own  terms,  an  explanation  which  prioritizes  a  phenomenological
explanation is just as coherent – it is no less, and perhaps more, plausible.4
My argument in this work will be that phenomenological and structural
social  relations  outweigh  and  predominate  over  scientific  research  into
physical brain-states. This is not to say that the physical sciences cannot
make  important  discoveries,  which  would  be  a  ludicrous  argument,  but
simply that the structures of everyday experience are such that they are far
more informative on the issue of the mind. I contend that this is because
the scientist and the philosopher of mind (for want of a better designation)
are  not  examining  the  same  thing,  and  indeed,  are  not  even  operating
within commensurable paradigmata; although, some of the terms, such as
‘quality’  and  ‘quantity’,  apply  for  both  the  scientific  world-view  and  the
phenomenologico-philosophical,  which  is  one  of  the  chief  causes  of
confusion.
4 ‘Scientists, Linking Gene With Serotonin and Depression, Offer Insights to New Treatments’, 
ScienceDaily, 2006 <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006/01/060106131350.htm> [accessed
30 September 2017].
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To a certain degree, though not one explored in great detail here, it could
be said of a great body of philosophical work in the philosophy of mind that
it is in thrall to the original dispute between Platonism and Aristotelianism
over the priority of matter.  It  is argued secondarily in chapter two,  that
Descartes  adopted  a  Platonic  position  regarding  the  importance  and
essential  reality of form over matter,  whereas the modern materialist  is
merely  returning  to  the  scholastic  appropriation  of  Aristotelian
metaphysics,  which  maintains  that  the  primary  and  most  real  form  of
substance is matter.
Finally, I argue that John Searle and Daniel Dennett do not succeed in
escaping this problem. Whilst their positions are more nuanced than the
more  straightforward  arguments  of  materialists  or  dualists,  they
nevertheless  fall  into  the  difficulty  of  regarding  physical/material
phenomena as possessing the power of arbitration over truth. It could not be
denied that states of affairs must possess such power of arbitration in any
dispute where a particular state of affairs is in question; however, the term
state  of  affairs can mean  many things  and not  necessarily  the  bijective
truth-condition of the correspondence theorist.5
5 By this I am particularly intending to refer to the correspondence theory of truth maintained by John 
Searle in The Construction of Social Reality. A state of affairs I take to mean any experiential state in
which there is some discernible structure such that it is possible in principle to determine whether 
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In chapter three, I argue in favour of the limited and cautious acceptance
of the concept put forward by Varela,  et al., of embodied cognition. They
proposed  the  notion  that  conscious  action  comprises  many  quasi-
autonomous subsystems, which are sufficient to carry out most apparently
conscious functions. As such, Varela,  et al.,  and their successors, such as
Andy Clark, suggest that the notion of a ‘central processor’ or centralized
control  over  cognitive  processes  is  redundant.6 Moreover,  I  examine  the
theory  of  M.  Johnson.  He  maintains  that  in  addition  to  an  essentially
embodied existence, which involves an immanent acquaintance with reality
initially  unmediated  by  ‘proposition’  thought,  perception  of  reality  is
conditioned by a series of neo-Kantian schemata. Johnson argues that the
individual’s embodied reaction to the world is conditioned by what he refers
to as ‘image-schemata’, taking the term from Immanuel Kant. These image-
schemata  involve  such  fundamental  concepts  as  ‘containment’,  which  he
proposes  might  ordinarily  be  supposed  to  act  as  a  specific  propositional
belief about the world; however, he maintains that these schemata are non-
that state of affairs exists concurrently with a given situation or not. This leaves it open to 
structuralist and phenomenological interpretations of experience such as I intend to argue for.
6 Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and 
Human Experience (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1991).
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propositional forms fundamental to the way in which acting agents interact
with the world.7
Contrary  to  Johnson’s  position,  I  reject  the  idea  of  image-schemata
because of  their  neo-Kantian tendency to  suppose the need for inherent
internal structures to comprehend the structure of the world. I argue that
they were unnecessary for Kant and remain unnecessary and unjustifiable
today. In my final conclusion, I suggest that the need to regard fundamental
modes  of  being  in  an  essentially  propositional  way  is  because  of  the
difficulty in separating the structure and influence of language, and social
interpellation from more fundamental  categories,  or indeed,  determining
what those categories represent independently of those structures.
I then draw certain parallels between theories of embodied cognition and
phenomenology.  I  suggest  that  whilst  Varela,  et  al.,  Johnson,  and Clark
prefer Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology appears to provide
a  more  suitable  framework  for  the  analysis  of  the  immanent  categories
(existentialia)  of Being, for reasons given at length in both chapters three
and five.
7 Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind (London: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
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Finally, I discuss the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan. I suggest
that Lacan’s concept of the mirror-stage in the formation of the ‘I’ can be
modified with the theory of J. P. Muller, who suggests that the initial stage
in  the  formation  of  the  ‘I’  is  the  semiotic  relationship  with  the  mother.
Combined, I argue they can account for the arguments of R. A. Lynch, that
recognition of the self presupposes recognition of the other.8
With  this  in  mind  I  examine  Lacan’s  categories  of  the  ‘self’:  the
imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. I argue that Lacan’s categories, in
showing how a sense of self develops, can also be employed in conjunction
with Heideggerian ontology and a broader linguistic structuralism than the
one Lacan uses (chapters four and five), to lead to an understanding of the
ontological status of qualitative perception.
Through  the  notion  of  the  unification  of  the  self  as  object,  and  its
essential contradiction in the other (the initial real), and its movement to
the  symbolic,  which  is  governed  largely  by  linguistic  structure,  where
interrelations  take  the  place  of  the  self-image  or  imaginary  and  its
contradiction,  the  real,  becomes  the  imaginary  conditions  in  which  the
8 Richard A. Lynch, ‘The Alienating Mirror: Toward a Hegelian Critique of Lacan on Ego-Formation’,
Human Studies, 31 (2008), 209-221.
12
symbolic social links are no longer symbolic. It is within this structure that
I propose to situate the sense of meaning and qualitative perception.
In  the  fourth  chapter,  I  consider  the  roles  of  language  and  social
interaction on the structure of the self. In the first place, I argue that F. de
Saussure, sometimes referred to as the ‘father’ of structural linguistics for
his role in explicating the nature of those structures, provided a framework
which  emphasised  the  synchronic  structure  of  language  over  the
diachronic.9 I follow the critiques of Saussure iterated by J. Derrida and
also by V. N. Vološinov / M. M. Bakhtin. Unlike Saussure, who proposes an
arbitrary but nonetheless fixed relation between the physical sound and the
conceptualization it  signifies and wherein all  meaning in language flows
from the abstract  langue  as opposed to the dialogic  parole or ‘speech act’,
Vološinov  suggests  that  the  linguistic  sign  is  formed  primarily  in  and
through  dialogue,  or  Saussure’s  parole.  Linguistic  dialogue  forms  an
important part of the conclusion of this work, since ultimately, it is through
the linguistic sign that the symbolic relations of the world are transformed
into internal as well as external relations (see chapter five).
9 Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de Linguistique Générale (Paris: Édition Payot, 2016).
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I  then  turn  directly  to  interaction  itself.  Why  ‘directly’?  Because
everything  prior  to  this  deals  with  abstract  and  ontological  categories;
however,  while  ontological  categories  are  of  primary  interest,  it  is  also
important to understand something of normative behaviour as well, which
is  why  I  consider  the  research  E.  Goffman,  E.  A.  Weinstein,  P.
Deutschberger,  and  R.  T.  Serpe.  As  social  psychologists  they  record  and
analyse  observed  behaviours  rather  than  theorizing  about  abstract
categories. It is useful, therefore, to take account of interactionist theories,
which operate at the normative and ontic levels, to seek understanding of
the  way  these  normative  behaviours  and the  general  character  of  those
behaviours could be seen to influence the structure of social being.
The theories  of Goffman,  et  al.,  argue that individuals in any setting
attempt to establish what they refer to as ‘face’, and once established they
perform  numerous  exercises  in  order  to  maintain  or  enhance  it.  Their
concepts attempt to show how the expectations of others and the self within
a social setting inform behaviour and attitudes down to the most minute
details.  Although  I  suggest  that  there  is  a  tendency  merely  to  render
everyday life into a technical vocabulary, and treat these relations as if they
were  alien  to  the  observer  without  performing  the  quintessential
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generalizations  of  the  social  scientist,  I  nevertheless  conclude that  their
study is heuristic in the sense that it demonstrates the predominance of
interaction in the formation of particular social structures.
In  the  penultimate  section  of  chapter  four,  I  analyse  the  structural
Marxist  theory  of  L.  Althusser.  Here,  I  show how Althusser  adopts  the
Lacanian categories of the imaginary, symbolic and real, and employs them
as categories of social interpellation. Althusser proposes that it is through
the  interpellation  of  the  subject  by  the  ideological  superstructure  that
causes  him to  surrender  himself  wantonly  into  alienation.10 In  my final
conclusion  I  employ  this  concept,  without  attaching  to  it  those  specific
ideological dynamics in order to move towards a demonstration of the way
structure itself can be seen to generate meanings, and thereby, ‘qualities’.
Consonant with the material presented over the first four chapters of
this work, I will argue in chapter five for an understanding of meaning that
considers the relations and interrelations of networks of signifiers to be its
basis. I demonstrate how ‘meaning’, by its nature, always attempts to refer
to something beyond itself. In structuralism, the relations of signs to other
10 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and State Apparatuses’ in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. 
Ben Brewster (London: Monthly Review Press, 1971) 
<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/althusser/1970/ideology.htm> [accessed 25 September 
2017].
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signs provides the basis on which this kind of signification, i.e., meaning,
can take place.
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II
Antinomic Problematics in
Analytic Philosophy of Mind
i. Overview and introduction to the problem of perception 
and elucidation of the heterogeneity and interdependence 
of the perceptual sign within an experiential nexus.
In this chapter I contend, firstly,  that the difficulties associated with an
analysis  of  perception  are  related  principally  to  the  peculiar  status  of
perception, being both a response to external stimuli but also influenced by
internal  structures.  Furthermore,  that  the  categories  of  ‘quality’  and
‘quantity’  have  been  misunderstood  by  contemporary  philosophers  in  a
subtle way,  but one which has led to a number of issues preventing the
resolution  of  problems  and  perpetuating  antinomic-style  debates  about
their priority and reducibility/irreducibility. Secondly, I will show that  the
structures of  the classical  model,  themselves  marrying the structures  of
Cartesian  dualism  with  Aristotelian  materialism,  continue  into
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contemporary  theories  of  the  mind,  and  are  thereby  obstructive  in  any
attempt to find a solution to the problem of perceptual consciousness. In
this, I am partially in agreement with J. Searle and D. Dennett that the
persistence  of  classical  categories  leads  to  an  antinomic  oscillation  and
insuperable intellectual stalemate; although, I argue below that they are
unsuccessful in attempting to discover a solution.
When the structure of perception is considered, it is seldom in isolation,
or  indeed,  as  a  point  of  departure.  It  is  difficult  if  not  impossible  to
demarcate  the  proper  parts  of  a  perceptual  field  as  constituents  of  a
‘scientific’  object  susceptible of  analysis,  or to  satisfy the ontological  and
epistemological concerns which have instigated the analysis. To know what
a  percept  is,  its  physical  mechanisms,  its  relations  and  categories,  its
ontological and epistemological essence, is only to understand a manifest
structure whose roots extend beyond the mechanics of perceptual acuity. If,
for  instance,  every  particular  function  involved  in  the  generation  of  a
perceptual image were fully apprehended, what then would be known to the
neuropsychophysiologist of the meaning of the forms given in perception? 
There can be little doubt that such an endeavour must involve knowledge
of the cranial nerves (oculomotor, ophthalmic, olfactory, trochlear etc.), they
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would need to  comprehend the roles  of  the  hemispheres  and the corpus
callosum, the lateral geniculate nucleus, and visual cortex in ordering and
interpreting the images transmitted through the optic nerve; it would also
be  useful  to  acquire  an  intricate  knowledge  of  the  operations  of  the
amygdala,  which  controls  emotional  responses  to  stimuli,  and  the
cerebellum,  which  is  responsible  for  coordinating  the  sense  of
proprioception. Were the ‘image’ apprehended in this way, and every facet
rendered into its ‘appropriate’  scientific vocabulary, it  might (at least,  in
principle)  be  possible  to  predict  every  characteristic  by  its  quantitative
metric;  however, might it not be possible, similarly in principle, that the
explananda  remain as residua of the  explanans and the operation of the
faculties pertaining to apprehension? Certainly, the Smartian suggestion,
that  science  presents  an  inexorable  tendency  towards  the  treatment  of
phenomena of every kind as ‘physico-chemical mechanisms’ cannot easily be
repudiated or dismissed.11 Indeed, there is  every reason to suppose from
contemporary methodologies alone, such as the quantitative turn towards
‘cognitive  science’  in  preference  to  a  general  ‘philosophy of  mind’,12 that
there is  much to be gained by both biological and statistical methods in
11 J. J. C. Smart, ‘Sensations and Brain Processes’, The Philosophical Review, 68 (1959), 141-156 
(142).
12 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: the Embodied Mind and its Challenge to
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
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interpreting  and  furthering  understanding  of  perceptual  apparatus  and
phenomena; it would be an act of the greatest futility to attempt to suggest
otherwise. For, as Smart himself, and others, have pointed out, synonymy
semantic or, in particular, descriptive is nonsensical if it is understood to
mean that ‘lightning  is  a certain kind of electrical discharge’ implies that
the  terms  on  the  left  of  the  copula  are  semantically  and  descriptively
synonymous with the terms on the right.13 
There is scope, therefore, even under the most rigorous of scientisms for a
multiplicity of interpretations. The principle, for the Smartian trope, also,
in non-chronological fashion, followed by U. T. Place, D. Armstrong et al., is
the reducibly of all phenomena, including those which appear to,  through,
within,  or  by means of a  mind,  to  the  fundamental  truth,  or  more
fundamental reality, of physico-chemical description.14 If, as is implied by
his  suggestion  that  an  experiential  or  perceptual  report  is  to  describe
something logically  coherent  in  itself,  thus  allowing the  sensation  to  be
something  –  just  not  a  real  or  accurate  description  of  an  existing
13 J. T. Stevenson, ‘Sensations and Brain Processes: A Reply to J. J. C. Smart’, The Philosophical 
Review, 69 (1960), 505-510 (505); Smart, op. cit., 144; Ullin T. Place, ‘Is Consciousness a Brain 
Process?’, British Journal of Psychology, 47 (1956), 44-50;  David M. Armstrong, A Materialist 
Theory of Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968).
14 The semantic distinctions, such as those between state, event and process elaborated by Place (1972, 
107), appear to make little difference to the notion described here. In each case, whether the analysis 
is of static atomic structures, synchronically judged events, or diachronically relatable processes, the 
result remains more or less the same: that which is susceptible of scientifically delineable analysis is 
of a more real nature than that which relies on this underlying process.
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independent state commensurable with the extant scientific paradigm, –
Smart believes that the nomological status of sensation is subordinate in
every way to the physical, then it becomes clear that he accepts not only the
ontological primacy of physical matter,  a case against which it  has been
difficult  to  argue  since  Aristotle,  but  its  ultimate  nomological  primacy.15
Whether  there  exists  an  explanatory  gap,  as  intimated  above,  the
narrowness and insufficiency of initial mind/brain process identity has been
widely  accepted.  It  is,  nonetheless,  towards  the  retention  of  physical
nomological primacy at which almost all succeeding analytical philosophy
has aimed, or at least, the reconciliation of the experiential world with the
fundamental reality of that perceived by the aid of scientific knowledge and
apparatus.16 It is not my intention to defend, or appear to defend, any kind
of dualism; as materialism struggles to define the mental in physical terms,
dualism struggles to define it in terms which facilitate a coherent structure
of correlations between mental events and physical events. Whilst this most
evidently  applies  to  epiphenomenal,  parallelistic,  or  Cartesian  naive
substance dualism, I would also not concede, for reason which will become
15 I will leave for now Davidson’s arguments against the idea of psycho-physical laws (1980, 214-15). 
Whilst it is true that Davidson and others have developed these theories to accommodate difficulties 
inherent in a straightforward reduction (Cf. Kim, The Myth of Nonreductive Materialism in 
Supervenience and Mind (1993)), I will maintain that these advances, when taken together produce 
an antinomic dynamic oscillating between the mental event and physical event in such a way as to 
resolve neither. In this, as I mention below, I am supported by John Searle and Daniel Dennett.
16 Kim, op. cit., 265.
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clear below, to so much as a dual modality or different coherent systems of
properties  relating exclusively to the mental  kind and the physical  kind
respectively.17 
How, then, with the full set of neurobiological facts and the philosophical
categorial  underpinnings  to  support  the  exclusively  physico-chemical
interpretation of perception, is the apperceived ‘image’ to be broken down
into its atomic components? Does a tree, or a shrub have a physical schema
that  relies  on  nothing  that  is  not  susceptible  of  physico-chemical
decomposition and analysis? In what manner are those structures which
rely entirely upon the act of apperception for their sense to be understood
within  this  paradigm?  Or,  as  Jaegwon  Kim  suggests,  the  reduction  of
‘ethical expressions’ to ‘”descriptive” or “naturalistic” expressions?18 It is, as
mentioned  above,  not  beyond  the  realms  of  conceivable  possibility  that
explanations for these difficulties could be found to adhere to the principles
of a quantitative metric, but no presently satisfactory answer has yet been
supplied. The principle at issue here is simply that however an abstract or
logical  argument  may  function  in  assessing  the  physical  aspects  of
17 To a degree, this latter point can be supported by Davidson’s contention that there are no psycho-
physical laws owing to the absence of a predicate-language applicable iff the event to which it is 
applied is mental. (Davidson, 1980).
18 Kim, op. cit., 265.
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perception, there remains an explanatory gap between the qualitative and
quantitative explanations – what I have referred to above as residua. An
explanatory gap has been proposed by both D. Chalmers and T. Nagel,19
although  I  have  explained  below  my  reasons  for  believing  that  their
antireductionist responses to physicalist theories do not present a dissoluble
problem. I do not intend to expound this latter notion fully at this stage,
rather  to  employ  it  as  an illustration  of  the  ambiguities  in  analyses  of
perception in general.
In  general,  physicalist  theories  of  mind  rely  on  a  classical  model  of
perception  inheriting  its  categories  from  enlightenment  and  post-
enlightenment  thought.  The  classical  model  of  perception  is
phylogenetically derived from the empirical theories of John Locke, and it is
from him that it is possible to see a clear expression of the notion of an
inverted Cartesian bifurcation between the internal structures and external
structures of perception. Although, in a sense, the Cartesian duality of the
res cogitans  and the  res extensa  has been inverted returning, it could be
argued, to the Aristotelian notion of the ultimate priority of matter over
‘secondary’  substances,20 the  essential  dyad  and,  as  D.  Owens  argues
19 Nagel, op. cit.; Chalmers, op. cit..
20 Aristot. Organ.; also, cf., Aquinas, ‘Praeterea, nihil est in intellectu quod non sit prius sensu. Sed in 
Deo non est ponere sensitivam cognitationem, quia materialis est. Ergo ipse non intelligit res creatas,
23
concerning  David  Hume,  the  motivation  for  a  sceptical  philosophical
perspective are nevertheless preserved.21 The problem of the motivations for
scepticism need not be of immediate concern, but it will be addressed in
succeeding chapters for auxiliary purposes. It is the nature of the dyadic
structure of the classical model and its influence on contemporary theories
that  needs  to  be  explicated  as  a  presupposition  for  the  success  of  the
primary argument of this chapter. 
Each of these structural realms (internal and external) has a degree of
independent coherence, and particularly, its own set of relations. The self-
relations  of  internal  and  external  structures  render  them  edificial,
fundamental components of the reality they conjointly represent. Internal
and  external  structures  operate  as  distinct  but  interdependent  realms
conjoined through categorial interrelativity. In external relations lies the
essentially excitatory element to perception, the object, which, although it
maintains  its  external  relations  independently  of  any  perceiving  mind,
Berkeley’s adage of  esse est percipi  being an exception to a general trend
amongst enlightenment empiricists, it makes through its impression on the
cum non sint prius in sensu.’ (Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate q. 2 Articulus 3) 
<http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdv02.html> [accessed 09 Sept. 2017].
21 Brian P. McLaughlin and David Owens, ‘Self-Knowledge, Externalism, and Skepticism’, 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: Supplementary Volume, 74 (2000), 119-142.
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perceiver a secondary image, or representation, of itself. As Richard Aquila
has  also  suggested,  there  is  some  ambiguity,  for  instance,  in  Hume’s
understanding of impressions, as to what can form an impression; whether
it  is  primary,  and  represents  only  immediate  external  phenomena,  or
whether  the  awareness  of  perceiving  that  phenomenon  can  be  itself
considered an impression.22 Aquila intimates that the certainty with which
Hume dismisses  the  notion  of  a  unified,  simple  perceiver  suggests  that
impressions are only applicable to the immediately given within an external
field of perception: ‘For there is no contradiction in my claim that while my
awarenesses  are  never…  awarenesses  of  just  the  same  objects,  the
awareness  which  is  the  awareness  of  these  objects  is  always  the  same
particular.’23 To  some  extent,  Aquila,  in  stating  this  problem,  is  merely
restating the basis  of  the difficulty which presented to Hume his  initial
epistemological  hiatus between the assumption of  uniformity on the one
hand  and  its  demonstration  on  the  other,  and  which  Kant  resolved  to
pursue in his KrV. 
Hume,  despite  his  clear  enunciation  of  problems  remaining  from
empirical  philosophy  employing  categories  inverted  from  rationalist
22 Richard E. Aquila, ‘Brentano, Descartes, and Hume on Awareness’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 35 (1974), 223-239 (226).
23 Ibid., 227.
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doctrines, is unable to answer the epistemological puzzles he himself raises.
Hume’s  assumption  that  the  impressions  of  immediate  experience  are
ordered through unexamined ‘faculties’ of ‘ideas’ and ‘imagination’, for the
organizational  schema  which  Hume  generates  in  his  Treatise is  never
proven to be necessary or essential but stated in the opening sections in an
almost  axiomatic  fashion,24 are  rendered  by  Kant  into  an  explicit
internal/external  structure.  Indeed,  it  could  be  suggested  that  Hume’s
notions of ‘impressions’, ‘ideas’, and the faculty of ‘imagination’ are more
akin to general abstract categories than divisions of objects existing within
the mind. There is no description of the way in which these categories are
inescapably connected with any mind in particular. That is not to say that
these  categories  of  representation  are  necessarily  without  foundation,
merely  that  Hume  has  not  demonstrated  their  empirical  necessity  as
categories of mental representation. 
For Kant, whilst the structure is far more complex, the solution is much
more straightforward. By rejecting the idea of a  tabula rasa and allowing
that not all knowledge arises out of ‘experience’,25 Kant is able to separate
the concepts of ‘intuition’ from those of immanent ‘sensation’. Thus:
24 T 1.1.1-4. (The edition of the Treatise I use here is second edition of ed. P. H. Nidditch (1888).)
25 KrV, B1. (For all references to the Critique of Pure Reason, I follow the Norman Kemp Smith 
translation.)
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‘The explanation of the manner in which concepts can thus relate  a
priori to objects I entitle their transcendental deduction; and from it I
distinguish empirical deduction, which shows the manner in which a
concept is  acquired through experience and through reflection upon
experience, and which therefore concerns, not its legitimacy, but only
its de facto mode of origination.’26
Kant makes two significant conceptual distinctions. The first,  as already
mentioned, is  that between the organizational structure of the ‘intuition’
and  the  ‘sensation’  of  experience  giving  rise  to  it.  The  second  is  that
between the two kinds of deduction, above, analogous to the quid juris/quid
facti  dichotomy  of  legal  proof.27 Through  the  Kantian  internal/external
bifurcation  we  can  see  clearly  the  interdependence  of  the  internal  and
external structures of the classical model. In the internal are the  a priori
prerequisite categories, in the external the excitatory part of  a ‘Ding an
sich’. What does or does not cohere beyond the unification in perception of
these two structural edifices is not important for our present purposes, it is
simply  necessary  to  note  the  character  of  the  bifurcation,  and  now,  the
influence this has continued to exert in  almost all analytic philosophy of
mind. 
26 Ibid., B117.
27 Ibid.
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This essentially bifurcated character of the episteme – that of an internal
and external world of self-relations obtaining value in their coincidence –
informs  a  mind-body  dualism,  which,  though  the  inverse  of  Cartesian
rationalism nevertheless retains the problematic categories of that tradition
of  thought.28 No argument sensibly  constructed could suggest  that these
categories  enjoy  a  telos congruous  with  the  Cartesian  view  of  separate
substances; for indeed, the self-sufficiency of the understanding, central to
Cartesian epistemology, is diminished in the classical model so far as to
exert  influence only in an auxiliary  way and over  that  whose  form and
veridical reality have been established in spite of it. However, neither do the
ostensible differences between the Cartesian and classical understanding of
the internal/external dichotomy constitute a radical departure in principle
from the ontological structure of the Cartesian understanding of discrete
mental and physical realms. Here, I follow John Searle in supposing that
28  Although the kernel of consciousness remains principally internal, its substance is, to a much greater 
degree, externalized. In Descartes’ original thesis the theologically interpolated Platonic soul exerts a far 
greater influence in forming the substantia animi. The enlightenment model of the mind and its relation 
to the world by contrast emphasizes the foundation of ideas in the phenomena that form their substance, 
thus returning to the principles of Aristotelian scholasticism in the reassertion of the ultimate priority of 
matter – an interpretation also supported by Lacan, citing Aquinas’ De Veritate: ‘nihil est in intellectu 
quod non prius fuerit [sic] in sensu’ (2006: 61). Indeed, J. Carriero (2009) argues for a reading of 
Descartes contra Thomism, also U. Thiel (2011: 37-38). There could be some reservation over whether 
this reflects Descartes’ views accurately, certainly it would be misleading if we supposed his position to 
be represented by ‘nihil est in sensu quod non prius sint in intellectu’; however, his reductio method 
nevertheless represents an internalization of the mind and its priority in ascertaining perceptual acuity, 
which is inverted by the enlightenment thinkers in their adaptation and appropriation of Aristotelian 
materialism (‘Sed in Deo non est ponere sensitivam cognitationem, quia materialis est.’ (De Veritate)) It 
should also be noted that a significant proportion of sceptical empirical innovations, as well as being an 
attempt to integrate the new scientific methods into philosophical thinking, were a response to the 
Berkeleian hypothesis characterized roughly by a reversal of the Thomist principle (‘esse est percipi’).
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whilst materialist theories of mind explicitly reject Cartesian forms, they do
so  because  they  accept  those  categories  and  the  vocabulary  that
accompanies  them.29 Although  Searle’s  views  on  the  volition  of  analytic
materialism are instructive for our present purposes, we should note at this
stage that I intend to reject his solution to the problem, on the grounds that
even  when  we  adopt  a  single,  undifferentiated  vocabulary  for  all
phenomena, including the mental, it does not dissolve any of the difficulties
surrounding the nature of perception or consciousness in general (except for
those relating specifically to Cartesian concepts).30 
It would be in error to suppose that because the mental in physicalist
theories of mind has been sublimated under the physical paradigm that the
problems  of  mental  content  are  thereby  resolved.  Even  were  the
realignment successful in principle, the initial dilemma which gives rise to
both physicalism and dualism remains endemic. In essence, my contention
is that physicalism can never satisfactorily accommodate the mental within
29 John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), 28.
30 We should also not underestimate the extent to which the Cartesian kernel is straightforwardly 
inverted in Locke and Hume. Descartes, for instance, in his first reply to objections to his 
meditations, argues that the ‘idea’ of the sun existing in the mind is the most real and objective vision
of the sun, although related to a less reliable external object referenced by the designation “sun”. In 
Hume, the assumption is directly reversed; objective knowledge is gained only through experiential 
means and cannot be derived from the ideas which are formed of these objects. This illustration is 
less directly clear in Locke, and later, in Kant, but the principle remains the same, and the principles 
which motivate their inquiries are similar enough to Hume’s that it is not necessary to analyse them 
separately for the purposes of this paper.
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a category whose definition has been adopted from a system that claims a
categorial  distinction  between  the  mental  and  the  physical31 and  that
dualism, or nonphysicalism, is unable to account for the mental in such a
way that it does not appear to breach what the physical sciences claim to
know about the laws governing reality.32
An illustrative example of the stated principle can be witnessed in the
work of the physicalist philosopher of mind Kim. Kim argues that there is
no form of consistent non reductive materialism, suggesting that any such
materialist must resort to eliminativism if he is not prepared to accept the
tenets of reductionism.33 He contends that, in conformity with what he calls
the ‘causal-closure principle’, a nonphysical property can not act in a causal
way  upon  a  physical  property.  A  physicalist  theory  must  maintain  this
causal  closure  or  it  is  by  definition  allowing  elements  efficacy  of  a
nonphysical nature and is, therefore, at least, dualist.34 Donald Davidson
falls before this criterion; his notion of ‘anomalous monism’, that there are
such things as psychophysical events but they are not sufficiently replicable,
or in principle categorizable, so as to be called laws. In order to maintain
31 Following Searle, above.
32 ‘Claim to know’ is not intended as implied criticism of the sciences, it is simply a variety of 
epistemological ‘insurance’.
33 Kim, op. cit., 267.
34 Kim employs a similar strategy against Dretske in his essay ‘Dretske on how reasons explain 
behavior’ (op. cit., 285-308).
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the principle of causal closure he needs to deny causal efficacy to mental
events,  as  such  Kim  considers  Davidson’s  theory  to  be  a  form  of
eliminativism: ‘but mentality is given no useful work and its occurrence is
left … causally inexplicable.’35 Similarly, functionalist theories and the idea
of ‘supervenience’ are found wanting by Kim (as answers to reductionism).
It is not necessary, and might serve only to delay further the drawing of
preliminary conclusions,  to  relate in great  detail  Kim’s  critique of  these
concepts.  It  should  be  sufficient  to  say  that  his  method  is  the  same as
before,  the  attempt  to  reconcile  the  mental  and  the  physical  inevitably
leads,  in  pursuing causal  closure,  to  the  effective  elimination  of  mental
content to avoid dualism or the reduction of psychophysical content entirely.
Although Kim presents what he feels to be the grounds for a solution to this
problem within the strictures of the physicalist paradigm, relying on the
notion of a local supervenience36 of ‘micro-’ to ‘macro-’ extension of causal
efficacy, which is not in principle epiphenomenal, it is not clear how he can
claim,  whilst  maintaining causal  closure,  to  allow for biconditionality in
psychophysical dynamics merely by stating the need that all mental events
have physical correlates. 
35 Kim, op. cit., 270.
36 That is, supervenience which holds only in contingent cases, unlike global supervenience, which 
pervades all possible worlds.
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 It is not important here to iterate every kind of physicalist theory to
demonstrate the point we wish to make; functionalism, for instance, as a
response to Smartian identity theory, criticises the identity theorists from
within the categorial paradigm we intend to reject. They fail, not because
their  arguments  are  endemically  antinomic,  but  because  they  are  too
specific as to the necessary physical-chemical brain structure required for
certain phenomenal events.
It  seems  eminently  plausible  from this  that  regardless  of  the  way in
which scholars attempt to circumvent the limitations of physicalist doctrine,
the  natural  (antinomical)  vacillation  between the  mental  properties  and
physical properties will likely continue indefinitely, as long as the categorial
structure of their thinking remains the same. It would take too much space,
here,  to  demonstrate  every  variable  and  accommodate  every  possible
counter to the suggestion; however, the principle, having been shown to be
feasible in general, provides a sufficient premise for what follows, and finds
support from both Searle and Daniel Dennett.37
37 Searl, op. cit.; Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin Books, 1991).
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i.1 The statement of the problem of qualitative perception 
from the perspective of analyticity and its failure to 
construct a superable challenge
Perception,  in  general,  possesses  both  a  qualitative  and  quantitative
component. The question of the irreducibility of the one to the other, as we
shall see, whilst useful heuristically is based on a category mistake. It has
led thinkers  such as  David  Chalmers  and Thomas Nagel  to  attempt  an
ontological, as well as categorial, bifurcation between these two elemental
representations of matter. They suppose that there are two issues that must
be addressed: the nature of quantity, a problem for the scientist to solve,
and quality or the ‘what it is like’ of experience.38 It may, ostensibly, appear
self-evidently  true  that  perception  revolves  around  ‘quality’,  whereas
scientific endeavour deals with ‘quantity’, or the reduction of multifarious
phenomena to magnitudes of determinable and predictable kinds. To some
extent, reduction does not mean reduction. In one sense, a reduction could
be taken to indicate that each distinct part of the one category could be
identified  with  a  distinct  part  in  the  other  (bijection),  rendering  the
functional  differentiation  of  each  effectively  meaningless;  a  literal
identification  of  the  two  categories,  however,  would  not  be  necessary  in
order for the term ‘reduction’ to apply. Whilst, certainly, the term implies a
38 Chalmers, op. cit.; Nagel, op. cit.
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decrease  in  the  discrete  parts  of  the  reduced  object,  there  is  no  reason
unless  specified  to  assume  that  it  must  be  an  indefinite  decrease,  or
subsumption of every part under, in this case, a quantitative paradigm. In
the case of the quantitative reduction here referred to, it is supposed that
since  all  phenomena  can  be  related,  in  principle,  either  to  relations  of
number  or  to  algorithms  which  determine  the  variable  magnitude  of
quantity,  that  these  magnitudes  obtain  priority  over  ‘quality’.39 ‘Quality’
takes on the form which, while being permitted its own discrete parts in the
form  of  ‘representations’,  ultimately  supervenes  on  a  layer  of  greater
‘reality’.40 There  are,  however,  several  concerns  with  this  interpretation,
which I will enumerate below.
Firstly, whilst the elements of the perceptual field are, as Aristotle well
noted,  in  principle  susceptible  of  representation  either  as  ‘quality’  or
‘quantity’, each being a fundamental precept of Being in general, ‘quantity’
appears as both ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ in perception.41 They are both, that
is, categories ‘of’ and categories ‘within’ sensible experience. As such they
function to  order the sensible world according to its  different  kinds and
39 Cf. George Kimball Plochmann, ‘Is Quantity prior to Quality?’, Philosophy of Science, 21 (1954), 
62-67.
40 J. J. C Smart, Armstrong, et. al. fall into this category of thinker. Ultimately, identity theory rests on 
the fundamental assumption that the degree of reality or unreality, or, more accurately, truth is 
determined by causal priority. It is this which I am attempting to illuminate here for future exegesis.
41 Aristot. Met. 5.1020b; also cf. Ibid. 13.1083a.
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multiplicity as general inextricable facts of existence, but, as well as this
general division of function they perform a normative function as well, that
of  the  delineation  of  particular  objects  in  experience  according  to  their
individual appearance and their number. 
The  unambiguous  dichotomy  of  the  sciences  between  magnitude,
represented as number, and experience, that vague and subjective property
of perception whereby complex objects are represented to the perceiver as
irresolvable  ‘simples’  each with their  own self-referring analogy  or  ‘feel’,
represents, in an important sense, a false dichotomy, an absolute distinction
where  there  are  only  degrees.  Each  object  of  perception  possesses  the
quality  of  number,  in  which  sense,  it  is  a  fundamental  category  of
experience.  However,  in  theories  influenced  by  this  ‘quality/quantity’
bifurcation, the categories are applied in a way distinct from the perceptual
realm in which they are discrete categories. This constructs an artificial
problem of an irreconcilable anomaly, the presence of undefined qualia in a
material  world  where  the  criteria  for  validation  are  observability  and
testability.  The  category  of  ‘quality’  must,  since  there  clearly  is  an
experience of such a phenomenon, belong to a paradigm entirely separate to
that  of  ‘quantity’.  A  choice  presents  itself  of  either  subsuming  ‘quality’
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under  ‘quantity’  by  reducing  the  one,  categorially,  to  the  other,  which
Chalmers and Nagel argue cannot be done, or admitting of something ‘in
addition to’ the physical, namely, a ‘what it is like’ to be.42 
Secondly, the ‘what it is like’ of experience is by its nature self-referential.
It  is  a feeling,  or sense, derived from the praxical notion of agency, and
adapted from a vocabulary of comparison and analogy. When the reference
is transfixed by the relations given in the totality of experience, the ‘what it
is like’ is a comparison between two qualities, i.e., ‘redness’ and ‘blueness’.
Nagel,  however,  claims  that  ‘what  it  is  like’  refers  not  to  a  comparison
between two experiences, but to a sense of ‘how it is for the subject himself.’
Nagel is  right to suppose, as he does, that there must be an experience
unique  to  the  perceptual  interface  of  the  creature  that  experiences,  its
umwelt.  Behaving  as  a  bat  behaves  is  not  the  same  as  being  a  bat.43
Nevertheless, to ask the question ‘what is it like?’ or even ‘how is it for that
creature?’ is not the same as asking ‘how is it for me?’. In the latter case, an
agent is assuming the existence of their own immanent umwelt, as well they
might, but will only ever find in reply an answer of the form ‘it is like that’.
42 Nagel sensibly leaves open the question of reducibility, suggesting that it might be found possible, in
principle,  under some future conceptual paradigm. He is, however, unable to account for what this 
paradigm might look like.
43 Nagel, op. cit., 439.
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Furthermore, it characterizes the problem as a ‘likeness’ in experience and
an objective, non-experiential world; it is unclear, as argued above, that any
such clear distinction is possible, even in principle: the ‘objective’ data form
both a category of experience and a category of ‘objective’ reality. What this
difference  in  the  two  senses  of  the  adjective  ‘objective’  means  ontically
remains a mystery. Nagel himself alludes to this mystery, recognizing the
potentially  insuperable  difficulty of  reaching ‘an end  point’.44 He further
claims that the conceptual framework enjoyed by contemporary thought is
not  sufficient  to  render  a  comprehensible  quality-quantity  relation  that
accurately encompasses both paradigmata.45 What remains problematic is
that  his  acknowledgement  of  the  subjective-objective/objective-objective
problem does not go far enough. Nagel continues to regard these categories
as  distinct,  the  one  containing subjective  experience,  the  other  objective
fact. For Nagel, the problem as it has been outlined here presents a problem
of perspective, of the orientation of the agent regarding the phenomenon
before him. In the sense in which there can be, for instance, a ‘scientific’
orientation towards a phenomenon, which seeks to explain its behaviour
within a specified frame of reference, this is self-evidently not wrong. If, as
44 Ibid., 443-444.
45 Ibid., 447.
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seems to be the case, Nagel intends to postulate a meaningful ‘objective’
category  outside  of  the  perceptual  structures  which lend  contextual  and
categorial fixity to the phenomenon, it is not precisely clear what ought to
exist outside of ‘perspective’ or ‘orientation’ in general. What could be said
of  the  notion  of  category,  beyond  that  which  is  understood  through  the
operation and integration of the perceptual function with whatever exceeds
its boundaries, if that is even a meaningful statement? 
I  understand  this  in  a  primarily  epistemological  way;  it  would  be
nonsensically solipsistic to suggest that categories do not exist in some form
or other independently of this or that perceptual experience, but it would be
equally  nonsensical  to  speak  of  categories  as  entities  independent  of
experiential features. The Kantian/Aristotelian table runs quantity, quality,
modality, relation. Each of these, though not determined by experience, are
conditioned by it to such a degree that it is incomprehensible to speak of
them in  terms of  abstract  reality.  Essentially,  it  seems most  likely  that
categories  are  categories  of  experience,  and  do  not  maintain  coherence
independently. It is in this way that Nagel, and by extension Chalmers, fails
to express the problem in a way that is in principle resolvable. It does not
seem  likely,  therefore,  contrary  to  Nagel’s  speculation,  that  any  future
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vocabulary  or  system  of  thought  can  develop  that  will  express  the
demarcation between a qualitative experience and quantitative descriptions
of the world in a way that can overcome the problem in his terms.
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i.2 Reformulation of the problem of perception from a 
phenomenological perspective
Nothing above should be regarded as particularly controversial. It should,
however,  be understood that if  the  phenomenon in perception cannot be
related categorially in a way that persists outside of a perceptual system,
then the totality of derivable states of affairs are inseparable from their
experience.46 Instead,  the phenomenon can be taken by itself;  perception
understood, not as a category of being but as a fundamental mode through
which its experience is manifested. Husserl, deriving his concept from two
notions, the first, Brentano’s ascription of ‘intentionality’ to mental activity,
and the  second,  ποχή́ἐ ,  or  restriction  to  only  the  immanent  qualities  of
perception, asserts that the study of immanent experience can yield a more
fruitful investigation into the nature of mind.
Whilst  Husserl’s  ποχή́ἐ ,  which  requires  that  the  subject  suspend  the
“transcendental” faculties in order to comprehend the pure intentionality of
immanent  experience,  might  recognise  the  essential  strata  of  awareness
with regards to perception it nonetheless fails to account for the inherent
complexity of the sign. That is not to suggest that Husserl was unaware of
46 John Searle in the Construction of Social Reality outlines, in addition to his already established 
categories of the individual mind, notions that extend these concepts into social categories as well.
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the complex and multifarious relations of phenomena in “lived experience”,
a great portion of his Ideas series focuses on the nature of these difficulties;
however,  his  reductive  phenomenology  does  illustrate  the  difficulty  of
approaching perception insofar as he considers experience reduced to pure
quality to be the most fundamental.47 Is “redness” an atomic particle of the
image  which  contains  it,  or  does  the  image,  only  once  given,  offer  the
opportunity  for  the  intellectual  abstraction  of  colour  into  a  pure  sign?
Certainly,  it  should  be  noted  that  Husserl  would  likely  argue  that  the
fundamentality  of  pure  quality  is  related  to  its  dynamic  noematic
significance  rather  than  any  static  relation  to  an  objective  image.
Nonetheless,  as  will  become  clear,  it  is  precisely  the  ambiguity  of  the
ontological  status  of  the  percept,  partly  historical,  partly  innate,  which
suggests  that  a  simplistic  hierarchy  of  fundamentality  could  not  fully
ascertain the nature of the phenomenon. 
In the scientific sense, the question of the deconstruction of any given
object is a simple one, a proper part is any constituent into which the object
47 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and Nakhnikian G. (New 
York: Springer, 1990) [henceforth Phenomenology]; Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and
to a Phenomenological Philosophy First Book: General Introduction to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten (Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983) [henceforth Ideas I]; 
Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy Second Book: 
Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. R. Rojcewicz and Schuwer A. (Lancaster : 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983) [henceforth Ideas II].
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is divisible whose characteristics and behaviours are uniformly definable,
and which maintains its coherence independently of its object (albeit, in the
Fregean sense, its  Sinn  will not persist). Although this definition may be
nothing more than a self-evident abstraction from the notions of ‘part’ and
‘scientific method’, it would be misleading to suggest that context and focus
were not significant in the delineation and decomposition of a whole into its
constituents. R. G. Winther, for instance, defends the view that the parts
that can be  obtained from a whole  will  vary depending on a contextual
framing: ‘Neither parts nor their relations… are pre-given. A partitioning
frame is  requisite.’48 Furthermore,  he  proposes  that  all  parts  should  be
thought of as abstractions from existing wholes. To a degree, this echoes the
concerns above regarding Husserl’s reductionism and the definition of parts.
Winther’s  thesis  of  contextuality,  in  principle,  can  be  accepted,  the
definition  of  part  and  whole  being  mutually  dependent;  however,  as  it
pertains  to  phenomenological  concerns,  the  variability  of  contextual
frameworks  (partitioning  frame)  and  the  definitional  categories  of
phenomenological  and  physical/biological  part-whole  relations  would not,
for  reasons  I  will  make  clear,  necessarily  appear  to  be  commensurable
48 Rasmus Gronfeldt Winther, ‘Part-whole science’, Synthese, 178 (2011), 397-427 (402-3).
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paradigmata.  In the case  of  the  (ap)perceived  image,  it  is  impossible  to
define  an objective  image  and its  experience  or  to  take the  parts  of  an
experiential context, and decompose it into a structure whose parts retain
their coherence independently of the image-object of which they form a part.
Unlike  biological  parthood,  where  the  parts  are  parts  by  contingent
definition,  in  phenomenological  parthood,  the  parts  are  ontologically
contingent on the image-object in question. Moreover, the image-object is
variable depending on factors such as, intentionality, state of mind, physical
acuity, et al. As Merleau-Ponty indicates: ‘Once again, reflection – even the
secondary reflection of science – renders obscure that which we believed
self-evident  [croyait  clair].  We  thought  we  knew  what  feeling,  seeing,
hearing were, and yet now they raise problems. We are invited to return
again to the experiences they designate and define them anew.’49 And, not
only this but the question of the efficacy of awareness, of the categories of
awareness, on perception. The scientific method is a means to escape an
epistemological  dilemma  between  empirical  reality  and  the  inherent
ambiguity of perception, as such, scientific thought manipulates the given
49 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la Perception (Paris: La Librairie Gallimard, 1945), 38,
<http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/merleau_ponty_maurice/phonomenologie_de_la_perception/
phonomenologie_de_la_perception.pdf> [accessed 07August 2017].
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through contextual definitions but does not need to question the given as
such.
There is already present, therefore, in the given image not simply the
atomic construction of sense-data passed and parsed through the activation
and  realization  of  nerve  impulses  but  a  conglomerate  of  superficially
disparate but fundamentally connected elements. In other words, an atomic
structuring of the image, audial, visual, sensory, remains too simplistic to
account for a theory of perception, and perception as a physical/biological
enterprise will only ever account for the mechanism of tropic production but
not  the  perceptual  image itself.  To  take a thought  experiment  from the
Gestaltists, if we take any image apperceived by a subject, there are many
strands and parts that compose this image, depending on the perspective
and orientation of the perceiver.50 Its structure, so far as it is apperceived,
contains no proper parts except for those that are so in virtue of its qualities
qua perception.  No single  fixed  interpretation  governing  its  perceived
aspects is given, nor is an atomic deconstruction of the image possible; and,
although  a  clear  correlation  between  stimulus  and  percept  can  be
50 Kurt Koffka, Perception: An Introduction to Gestalt-theorie 
<http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Koffka/Perception/perception.htm> [accessed 07 August 2017].
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measured, its interpolation possesses dependencies that are not governed
by a straightforward stimulus-response formula.51
With  this  understanding  of  the  ambiguities  of  perceptual,  or
phenomenological  analysis,  and  the  attendant  understanding  of  the
categories  of  ‘quantity’  and ‘quality’  that  we have explicated above,  it  is
possible to discover a possible solution to the problem of  the ontological
status of perceptual artifacts and their concomitant associations. In order to
pursue this in the way outlined in the introduction, it is first necessary to
show why Searle’s proposed solution fails to resolve those difficulties.
ii. Searle’s and Dennett’s proffered solution to the problem
of categorial classification
Much has already been explicated above regarding Searle’s recognition of
the categorial insufficiencies of analytic philosophy of mind. According to
Searle,  materialist  philosophy owes  its  state  of  inconclusive  limbo to  its
failure  to  grasp,  firstly,  that  the  ordinary  sciences  do  not  require  the
perpetuation  of  the  traditional  Cartesian  categories  adopted  from  the
classical  model,  and  secondly,  that  ordinary  linguistic  categories  do  not
necessarily reflect the state of affairs portrayed by a perceptive examination
51 cf. Weber’s law.
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of  the  present understanding of  the  physico-chemical  sciences.  Dennett’s
position closely follows Searle’s in this; he does not, as Searle does, develop
the notion as a theoretical minimum, but he does nonetheless attempt the
same method of supersession attempted by Searle.52 
Given  the  difficulties  which  he  has  outlined  Searle  explains  why
materialism as a doctrine is unnecessary. Briefly, there is some value in
Searle’s  description of the apparently atomic structure of reality and its
relation to evolutionary biology. It can hardly be denied that the boiling of
water is  caused by the movements of molecules governed by the laws of
thermodynamics.53 Furthermore, Searle proposes that the general character
of atomistic and biological supervenience – in this sense, not only physically
smaller  components,  but  temporally,  ontologically,  and  epistemologically
more fundamental ones – should be extended to consciousness. Biological
explanation allows for both explanation of the macro, logical, kind, and the
micro,  atomistic,  kind.  In  the  former,  the  explanation,  such  as  in  the
standard  theory  of  evolution,  allows  for  the  isolation  of  an  element  of
adaptation and its assessment as it tends to comport the organism toward
its environment or away from it. In the latter, only the mechanism by which
52 Dennett, op. cit., 101-138; I will primarily focus on Searle in this chapter of the essay as he 
expresses the relevant position most clearly, and as a distinct thesis rather than a corollary.
53 Searle, op. cit., 86-88; Dennett makes similar evolution based arguments in op. cit. (182).
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the adaptation functions is of interest. From this, Searle takes the position
that it  ought  to  be  natural  for  any philosopher of  mind to  assume that
consciousness is simply another function of the natural world.54 He states in
conclusion: 
‘And once  you accept  our  world  view the only  obstacle  to  granting
consciousness its  status as a biological  feature  of  organisms is  the
outmoded  dualistic/materialistic  assumption  that  the  “mental”
character of consciousness makes it impossible for it to be a “physical”
property.’55
It is not the present intention to reject the suggestion that evolutionary
biology influences the manifestation of cognitive processes. To do so would
be to make a claim which would be arrant nonsense. As Andy Clark has
noted  elsewhere,  all  natural  organisms  appear  to  possess  a  variety  of
umwelt related to the environment which forms their usual habitat; a non-
evolutionary explanation for this, whilst not impossible would be somewhat
improbable.56 There are, however, several problems with Searle’s account.
Most significantly, his departure from the dualist/monist paradigm is not as
complete  as  he  suggests.  Whilst  he  achieves  a  partial  escape  from  the
concomitant categories of most contemporary analytic philosophy of mind by
54 Searle, op. cit., 90.
55 Ibid., 91.
56 Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1998).
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speaking in positive rather than negative terms, the problems which gave
rise  to  those  difficulties  nevertheless  remain  in  place.  By  this,  I  mean
simply  that  his  description  of  biological  systems  at  least  describes
something with clear and unmistakable truths contained within it; however,
as I have attempted to show above, the principle of atomism and atomistic
deconstruction is far from absolute. The sciences occupy territory, which,
when  they  confine  themselves  to  analysing  straightforward  facts,  is
rightfully theirs. It nonetheless seems far less certain than Searle would
claim that the methods of heuristic deconstruction, conceptual and physical,
employed in scientific endeavours can be extended so easily to the problem
of consciousness. Despite of his attempts to recognize the ‘subjectivity’ of
consciousness  in  order  to  reconcile  the  established  character  of
consciousness with the paradigm of natural science,57 the methods of the
sciences are not equipped, as I hope I have shown above in (i.2), to supply
the means for this reconciliation.
57 Searle, op. cit., 93-100.
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III
Psychoanalysis and the
Structure of the ‘I’
Actions, in general, when compared to the self-ascribed motivations of the
actor  provide  a  basis  for  assessing  the  ‘state  of  mind’  of  he  who  has
performed  them.  But  even  this  relatively  simplistic  statement  begs  the
question: What do we mean when we speak of being in a ‘state of mind’? Or,
more precisely: of what do actions and motivations consist, and, what are
their relations to one another? As has been made clear above, the problems
of  the  mind  and  those  elements,  even  some  of  which  have  detailed
neurobiological/histological  explanations,  involved  in  the  generation  of
complex perceptual ‘images’ will yield very little from isolated interrogation.
The representation of complex objects, in the scientific sense, as simplexes,
in  the  phenomenal  sense,  being  an  illustrative  example  of  this  type  of
difficulty.  Indeed,  since  Kant,  and  more  recently  Brentano,  the  Gestalt
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theorists, and votaries of the contemporary notion of an ‘embodied mind’,
there is a strong argument that the production of the perceptual  ‘image’ is
comprehensible not as a neutral or passive observance of objective states of
affairs  external  to  a  perceiving  unity  but  only  as  the  product  of  a
combination of psychological dispositions, both conscious and unconscious.58
It is, therefore, necessary to clarify our understanding of the term ‘state of
mind’ and its corollaries and dependents if a more general understanding of
the ontological status of the ‘percept’ is to be achieved.
The mind, as Hume realized in a rudimentary way, is not an organ in
itself,  ordered into  multifarious forms that await  the input of  particular
events,  the  results  of  which  are  preordained  by  fixed  and  permanent
structures. Neither should it be understood as an infinitely plastic collection
of  Derridan indefinite  milieux;  it  is  not  that  there  are  contents  already
present which specifically intervene to cause this or that set of behaviours,
but that there are capacities, limits, and predispositions that form the basis
of a socialized action. 
58 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. D. B. Terrell (London: Routledge, 
2014); Koffka, Perception: An Introduction to Gestalt-theorie <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Koffka/
Perception/perception.htm> [accessed 07 August 2017]; Wolfgang Köhler, Selected Papers, ed. 
Mary Henle (New York: Liveright, 1971); Lakoff and Johnson, op. cit.; Johnson, op. cit.; Varela, et 
al., op. cit.
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If,  as  it  is  the  intended  purpose  of  this  chapter  to  demonstrate,
perception  relies  on  epistemic,  and  social,  familial,  and  extra-familial
interactions as much as on material objects,  then an understanding of the
qualitative  component  of  cognition,  the  ‘percept’,  can  be  determined  in
principle  from  the  study  of  social  cognition  and  the  formation  of  belief
systems.  I  do  not  make  this  claim  lightly,  but  base  it  entirely  on  the
available evidence. The gradual erosion of Cartesian  objectivist idealism,
and  its  replacement  with  an  empirical  account  of  perception  and  the
subjective ideas arising from it has certainly inverted the Cartesian cogito,
granting  priority  to  matter  over  its  abstract  idea.  However,  this  alone
merely  allows  for  the  object  that  which  it  already  possessed,  and  the
illuminative possibilities of a study of the objective relations of the external
and internal structures of perception without elements that examine the
relationships to the world is limited, as shown in the previous chapter. 
Furthermore,  I  base  this  claim  on  the  arguments  of  contemporary
philosophers such as Mark Johnson, who, drawing on the work of Merleau-
Ponty, has argued, with George Lakoff, for an interpretation of the mind
which  relies  on  a  combination  of  bodily  ‘situatedness’  and  metaphorical
abstraction. Although, their work seems to suffer from two main difficulties:
51
the first is the explicitly neo-Kantian tendency to construct fixed internal
forms  around  which  the  world  is  structured;  the  second  is  a  failure  to
recognize  fully  the  effect  of  higher-order  understanding  on  lower-order
concepts  –  they  appear  to  subscribe  to  the  notion  that  propositional
thinking  supervenes  on  non-propositional  concepts  without  affecting  the
‘quality’  of  the  base.  Neither  of  these  objections  is  prohibitive,  both  are
ultimately related to their attachment to classical categories,59 a fault for
which  Searle  also  criticises  many  contemporary  philosophers  of  mind.60
What is of interest is the notion of a fully embodied cognition. Finally, I base
it  on  the  experience  of  psychoanalytic  practice,  particularly  in  the
developments of Jacques Lacan. In his development of the psychoanalytic
method,  originated  primarily  by  Freud  and  Jung,  Lacan  combines  the
categories and clinical methods of Freud with the structural linguistic and
anthropological theories of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss.
It is this final element which will form the most significant part of our
argument. This chapter has two principal objectives. The first is to establish
59 Mark Johnson appears to have a different understanding of classical categories. It is true, as he 
claims, that the classical treatment of the categories of external phenomena has a rigidity which may 
well be unwarranted (op. cit., xi), but he nevertheless retains the synthetic structure of apperception 
conceived of by Kant (i.e., ibid., 164-6).
60 Searle, ‘The Bad Argument: One of the Biggest Mistakes in Philosophy in the Past Several 
Centuries.’ in Seeing Things As They Are: A Theory of Perception (New York: Oxford Scholarship 
Online, 2015) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199385157.003.0002> [accessed 19 
September 2017].
52
the general  principles  of  cognition,  not  necessarily exhaustive principles,
but those which are essential  for determining how perceptual  forms are
apprehended  qualitatively.  The  second  is  to  demonstrate,  through  the
categories  of  Lacanian  psychoanalysis,  how  the  dyadic  structure  of  the
intersubjective relation informs self-awareness through the internalization
of the other and the representation of the body-self as an other, and acts
upon the general principles in ways that inform the general character of
those percepts as they are presented in lived experience. I will argue below
that  regardless  of  the  clinical  success  or  failure  of  psychoanalysis,  the
theoretical  categories  developed from Lacan,  in  particular  those  adopted
from Claude Levi-Strauss, are useful in a full appreciation of the ontological
status of the percept. Furthermore, I will consider the concept of the ‘I’, the
self-referential locution, as a category in itself, and, as the differentia of the
‘self’  from  the  ‘other’.  Through  phenomenology,  theories  of  embodied
cognition and analyses of the categories of thought we are able to discover
general principles. Through psychoanalysis those general principles can be
applied to the specific minds of individuals.  
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i. The meaning in embodied activity and the non-localized
impetus of phenomena ascribed to subjective intuition in 
the classical model of perception.
i.1 The concept of embodiment as the overcoming of the 
tradition mind/body dichotomy and its limitations.
It was F. J. Varela, et al., who originally proposed a model for generating
autonomous  networks  or  systems  capable  of  assimilating  and  modifying
their structure in compatible ways rather than attempting to predefine a set
of  higher-order  symbolic  relations  as  the  foundation  for  an  intelligent
system.61 Functions are distributed throughout the system of connections;
there is to be no prescribed rules as such, but localized functions relating
only by incidence to a more general function.62 There is a sense in which
environmental interactions, such as these operations and the histological
example employed by the authors, reflect the arrangements of most natural
ecosystems.63 They are a confluence of individual parts ostensibly unrelated
to each other, in that they are not governed centrally, but whose coexistence
and repeated coextensivity produce a stable and, ostensibly, homogeneous
system. From the perspective of examining the end result,  it can appear
61 Varela, et al., op. cit., 87-91.
62 Ibid., 88.
63 This may seem a little unqualified; however, ‘ecosystems’ here simply refers to the dictionary 
definition of the term: ‘A biological community of interacting organisms and their environment’ (s . 
v. ‘ecosystem’, OED). And so, in a sense, what follows is little more than an elaboration of its 
dictionary definition.
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that such systems require some form of coordinating principle in order to
exist in the harmonious way that observation would suggest that they do.
The implications of this analogy can also be read into papers by S. Wolfram
and O. Martin, et al.64
The question of complexes and simplexes in perception seems to emerge
again  here.  In  the  previous  chapter,  we  made  two  principal  arguments
which are of use: firstly, we claimed that ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ were terms
relative  to  the  perspective  and  orientation  of  a  perceiver  rather  than
absolute terms that could be employed in a strictly scientific way without
ambiguity and potential  error;  and secondly,  that the concept of ‘part’  is
phenomenologically  and  definitionally  dependent  on  the  ‘qualities’  of  its
whole.65 Illuminating  the  problem  of  dynamic  stable  (‘self-organizing’)
systems can be achieved by a degree of decomposition similar to other kinds
of scientific deconstruction. As Varela, et al., point out, just as a cell can be
deconstructed  into  its  self-containing  components  of  cytoplasm,  rough
endoplasmic  reticulum,  etc.,  neuronal  networks  and  ecosystems  of
organisms  can be  shown to  consist  of  substructures,  of  which  there  are
64 Stephen Wolfram, ‘Computational Theory of Cellular Automata’, Communications in Mathematical 
Physics, 96 (1984), 15-56; Oliver Martin, Andrew M. Odlyzko, Stephen Wolfram, ‘Algebraic 
Properties of Cellular Automata’, Comm. Math. Phys., 93 (1984), 219-258.
65 A similar, though not precisely identical notion, was put forward by Hubert A. Simon (1969) in 
relation to parts and wholes in evolutionary biology.
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other substructures and so on, operating in the manner outlined above.66 In
essence, each complex network of units can itself be conceived of as a unit,
that is, unitary. In other words, the structure of complex systems where the
parts of that system are not necessarily inextricably linked in a physical
way  to  their  superior  parts  are  susceptible  of  analysis  under  methods
similar to those employed in the traditional sciences. The significance of
this is that the aspects and functions mind can be formally associated with
aspects and functions of the body through experimental means. 
If the arguments that I suggest above are true, then it is possible to
avoid  certain  of  the  consequences  of  the  classical  position,  i.e.,  those
accepted by Searle, which I reviewed in chapter I.  This is  the view that
because every perceptual function can be mapped onto a bodily function
then perception and its concomitant mental processes are resolvable under
those structures, and the qualitative aspects of perception can be explained
as emergent qualities  of  the system as a whole.  Firstly,  emergentism in
general is a non sequitur; it is not clear why these irreducible phenomena,
that in a scientific mode are susceptible of simplification, should appear in
the way they do on account either of the complexity of a system or of the
66 Varela, et al., op. cit., 105.
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system’s capacity to receive and organize, e.g., photoelectric input and the
translation  of  that  input  into  something  sensible.  Certainly,  a  complex
object might appear simple if it were obscured by distance or the spectral
resolution  of  the  viewer;  that  is  not  my  meaning,  all  phenomena,  as
demonstrated  in  the  previous  chapter,  are  accompanied  by  a  variety  of
meanings,  intentions,  orientations,  and  their  residua.  The  difficulty  in
determining the nature of these things lies not in their physical structure,
but  in  the  relation  between  their  physical  structure  and  their
phenomenological structure, which, based on the arguments we have made
concerning  the  quantity/quality  and  part/whole  relations,  are  not  to  be
reduced by physical analysis and experimental methods alone. This critique
applies equally to A. Clark, who will be examined in more detail below. In
order to maintain his position that emergence takes place on account of the
properties of the system alone, he maintains a focus on manifest behaviour
and takes the rest as given.67 Similarly, Johnson makes plain his feelings
that: ‘”higher” cognitive operations arise from the increasing complexity of
the organism-environment interactions.’68
67 It may be that this oversimplifies his thought a little, but I believe his general position is as I have 
characterized it.
68 Johnson, ‘Merleau-Ponty’s Embodied Semantics – From Immanent Meaning, to Gesture, to 
Language’, EurAmerica, 36 (2006), 1-27 (2). [henceforth Embodied Semantics].
57
Other developments in the field of embodied cognition such as those of
M.  Johnson  and  Clark  have  sought  expand  this  initial  study  both
experimentally  and  conceptually.  Clark  records  developments  in  the
practical  functioning  of  embodiment,  whilst  Johnson  proposes  a  novel
approach  by  attempting  to  connect  ‘nonpropositional’  concepts  to
‘propositional’  ones by means of  metaphor and analogy.  Later,  it  will  be
possible to see parallels between his approach to thought and language and
Lacan’s.
i.2 The theoretical development of embodied cognition 
and image-schemata as a means to explain the 
appearance of higher level reasoning and self-awareness 
of perceptual experience.
Clark,  speaking  of  the  development  of  modern  systems  of  artificial
intelligence, similarly to the observations of Varela, et al., makes the point
that  there  was  little  or  no  progress  achieved  in  attaining  a  degree  of
‘intelligent’  autonomy  from machines  until  it  was  decided  to  give  those
machines  rudimentary  bodies  through  which  to  interact  with  the  world
around  them.69 By  autonomic  processes,  that  is,  unconscious  in  the
69 Clark, op. cit; for an expression of the philosophical problem, cf., Hubert Dreyfus, Alchemy and 
Artificial Intelligence, (Rand Corporation, 1965) 
<https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2006/P3244.pdf> [accessed 20 September 
2017]..
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colloquial  sense,  the  body orients  itself  in multifarious ways towards its
intended purpose. These processes, whether or not a specifically conscious
thought may be involved, do not, according to Clark, Lakoff, Johnson  etc.,
require a ‘central executive control’.70 Clark, for instance, refers to the way
in which someone orienting themselves to catch a ball does so not with a
series  of  mathematically  worked out trajectories,  but by the unconscious
process of aligning their body and moving in such a way as to ensure that
‘the acceleration tangent of gaze from fielder to ball is kept at zero.’71 In
essence,  this represents,  according to Clark the immanent interaction of
body  and  world  without  the  requirement  for  preliminary  judicial
interference from a unified  knower as such. He argues, along with much
contemporary work in robotics and cognitive science, that the belief that
‘central thinking’ must govern organisms’ seemingly complex interactions
with  the  environment  is  based  on  a  fallacy:  ‘they  take  a  complex
phenomenon  …  and  look  for  a  single  determining  factor.  This  is  what
Mitchel  Resnick  … calls  ‘centralized  thinking’.72 Instead,  Clark  suggests
that  most  common  actions,  such  as  walking,  navigating  environmental
obstacles, and even completing a ‘jig-saw puzzle’ are developed through a
70 Clark, op. cit.
71 Ibid.
72   Ibid.
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process of ‘action loops’, where the actor  discovers by trial and error more
than by abstract reasoning the correct method of completion. Below, in a
more complete exegesis of the principles of both Clark and Johnson, I will
argue that whilst the principle which he establishes here of distribution of
cognition is  useful,  much of  the  general  theory of  embodied cognition is
lacking in firm philosophical foundations.
Johnson’s work is more a work of pure philosophy than the cross-over
between  philosophy  and  the  sciences  of  Varela,  et  al.  and Clark.  His
interest, not mechanistic to the same degree, is in finding ‘image-schemata’
that can explain how meaning can work within an embodied experiential
structure. As a proponent of embodied cognition, he maintains, similarly to
Varela, et al., and Clark, that the mind works through a series of localized
functions  that  are  in  essence  related  to  some  element  of  bodily  action.
Johnson explicitly separates propositional and nonpropositional ‘meaning’
into two different categories. 
Johnson  proposes  that  meaning  is  essentially  constructed  on  a
nonpropositional foundation. The first stage of this is the bodily distributed
mental functions outlined at length above. The second is the abstraction
from this of a series of image “Gestalts” or image-schemata. The final stage
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is the representation of these ‘forces’ through the features of propositional
language. The first stage, similarly to Clark, represents the body and mind
as intricately connected through distributed functions acting independently
and in concert to produce the necessary effect. He critiques what he calls
the  ‘objectivist’  view  of  meaning;  Johnson  attacks  the  notion  that  all
significant  epistemological  facts  can  be  represented  popositionally  in
traditional  linguistic  forms and that a sufficient grasp of  the underlying
logic  could  grant  a  ‘god’s-eye-view’  of  meaning  (i.e., Ayer’s  claim that  a
sufficiently  powerful  intellect  could  grasp  all  the  facts  of  logic  and
mathematics  from first  principles).73 In contrast,  he suggests that initial
meaning  is  formed  through  the  structures  of  immanent  experience:
‘Imaginative projection is a means by which the body … works its way up
into the mind … I want to stress the nonpropositional, experiential, and
figurative dimensions of meaning and rationality.’74
In the second stage, image-schemata, Johnson argues, with Kant, for
the  need  for  image-schematic  structures  to  ‘connect  concepts  with
percepts’.75 Although he regards Kant’s understanding of image-schemata
73 Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (London: Penguin Books, 2001), 85-6; Johnson, The 
Body in The Mind, xxxv-xxxvi.
74 Ibid., xxxvii.
75 Johnson, op. cit., 21.
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as  limited by  his  eighteenth-century  understanding of  ‘concept’,  he  does
consider this  essential  connection between concept  and  immanent bodily
percept  to  be  the  core  of  image-schematic  structure.  For  example,  the
concepts  of  ‘containment’  and  ‘boundedness’.  These  are  immanent  and
pervasive experiences as three-dimensional bodies, limited in capacity, and
this experience, according to Johnson, is internalized conceptually by the
interpolative  power  of  an  image-schema.76 It  is  the  structure  of  the
insuperable  conditions  of  being,  the  brute  facticity  rendered  into  fixed
schema  through  acquaintance  with  bodily  experience.  Indeed,  these
structures  are  specifically  to  be  denied  the  subject-copula-predicate
structure of an Aristotelian proposition. These schemata, Johnson further
argues,  should  be  considered  as  possessing  generality  as  opposed  to
specificity  –  i.e.,  the  type  ‘triangle’,  never  the  token  ‘that  triangle’.  As
Johnson  points  out,  if  correct,  these  schemata  pervade  most  action  in
general.77
As an attempt to unify, or discover an holistic basis on which to save the
subjective from complete sublimation under the structures of  distributed
consciousness, image-schemata represent a means to present a version of
76 Ibid., 22-3.
77 Ibid., 26-7.
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embodied  cognition  which  retains  a  central  coherence,  if  not  a  central
processor, in the sense that a sense of self, as we shall see from Johnson’s
third contention, can emerge from its relation to these schemata. 
For the third stage of his argument, Johnson proposes the extension of
particular bodily-cognitive feats through image-schemata and metaphorical
relationships. Through the example ‘schema’ of ‘balance’, Johnson explains,
similarly to Clark, that the direct activity of learning to balance with the
apparatus provided is achieved through an ‘action loop’ of repeated trial and
error.78 But  balance as a term,  and as  a concept,  can have multifarious
meanings –  equilibria of various kinds, for instance, can be said to be in
balance. It is from this specific, learned action that a preconceptual gestalt
or schematic image is formed. The conceptual schema here can be extended
to all the other uses of the term ‘balance’ by means of a nonpropositional
metaphorical leap; in conjunction with image-schemata, Johnson maintains
that  this  final  notion  is  sufficient  to  grant  an  explanation  of  general
meaning.
There are some problems with Johnson’s conception of image-schemata
which we should note for our exegeses below. Whilst there are some shared
78 The Body in the Mind, 75; Clark, op. cit.
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notions between Johnson’s account of image-schemata, and the immanent
structure of Being in Heidegger’s  fundamental ontology which suggest a
grasp of the meaning of nonpropositional content from a phenomenological
point of view, for instance, the concept of  horizons of Being in Heidegger’s
Sein und Zeit,  there remains, despite his attempts to avoid it, a sense of
abstract reasoning.79 In suggesting, for instance, the ideas of containment
and  boundedness  as  schemata,  he  cannot  retain  them  as  immanent
schemata beyond their initial facticity. The reason for this is simply that,
whilst the facts they represent are nonpropositional in the sense of being
merely  present and requiring no further understanding, his conception of
the schemata draws on propositional content, which, by his understanding
could only occur later. As schemata, Johnson is taking them to be something
other than the mere conditions of  being.  The limitations of  containment
appear in a meaningful way only when there is something outside or beyond
that an individual wants to do but is prevented from doing. The facticity of
this circumstance is part of the structure of overall Being, but is what the
encounter  of  an  individual  with  this  structure  comes  up  against
nonpropositional?  The  structure  itself  is,  by  definition,  external  to  the
79 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John McQuarrie and Robinson, E. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1962), §. 7.
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structures of propositional knowledge, but how can it be possible to isolate
the internal structure in such a way as to delineate without a great degree
of ambiguity what was or was not at one stage non- or pre- propositional
content?
If, as Johnson claims as his third contention, propositional knowledge is
derived from the metaphorical and analogical extension of image-schemata,
it  remains  unclear  why  those  schemata  should  be  internalized  as
nonpropositional structures. Certainly, as an explanation in neuroscience of
generalization  given  the  premise  of  embodiment  it  would  seem to  be  a
useful tool; however, as a philosophical structure it needs to explain more
than the mere apparent behaviours of individuals in relation to external
phenomena in order to justify its position. Johnson’s schemata are explicitly
based on the Kantian schemata. Kant explains the need for such schemata
thus: ‘Obviously, there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous …
with  the  category,  and  …  with  appearance,  and  which  thus  makes
application  of  the  former  to  the  latter  possible.’80 There  are  numerous
Kantian scholars, H. E. Allison records, who have wondered why Kant felt
the need to include this chapter in his Critique at all.81 That, of course, does
80   KrV, B177.
81 Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (London: Yale 
University Press, 2004), 202-3.
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not  automatically  denude  Johnson’s  schemata  of  a  sensible  purpose;
however, as we have seen, whilst he may wish to apply the concept to a non-
objectivist epistemology and ontology, the purpose served by the schemata
is the same. In a sense, it is important to recognize the subjectivity of the
Kantian scheme of categories; they are, in essence, internal mappings of
external  structures  that  provide  the  ground  for  knowledge  and
understanding  of  the  world  in  general.  The  categories  are  necessary
because they do not exist in a sensible form outside of the self. To speak of
schematic ‘bridge laws’ for applying these categories to the ‘percepts’ whose
phenomenal realization they are intended to govern, is to presuppose that
they are  lacking in  their  inherent  phenomenal  structure  and,  therefore,
require an additional point of interpolation from that gleaned by the sense
in  ordinary  experience.  Why,  however,  need  we  more  than  the  senses
combined with physical  and mental  faculties  in order  to  apprehend this
structure?
That image-schemata are superfluous to the structure of an embodied
theory of the mind should be clear from what has been said above. However,
the  full  extent  to  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  have  these  intermediaries
between conceptualizations and their phenomenal structure or, in Johnson’s
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case, between the extension of meaning through metaphors and their base
body-world structures.
i.3 The role and influence of phenomenology on embodied 
cognition, and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology as a 
potential solution for some of the limitations of the theory.
The role of self-aware consciousness of the variety traditionally meant
by  the  word  ‘conscious’,  whilst  not  eliminated  as  a  possible  mode  of
conscious being, is, according to the concept of embodied consciousness, not
essential to the fundamental environmental functioning of an organism. It
is worth noting that many of the ideas of embodied cognition are similar to
if not directly based on the work of phenomenologists as much as cognitive
scientists. Mark Johnson, for instance, cites Merleau-Ponty as a primary
influence on his thinking.82 Whilst Merleau-Ponty is referenced not only by
Johnson,  but  also  by  Clark,  and  Varela,  et  al., as  a  principal  direct
influence, Heidegger is usually cited only in a reluctant or auxiliary way, if
not left  out altogether,.  This may seem as something of a diversion,  yet,
whilst  Merleau-Ponty  has  developed  many  explicit  notions  regarding
phenomenological being and action in the world, Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit,
82 Johnson, Embodied Semantics.
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if put to correct use might shed greater light on the nature of an embodied
cognition.
It  is  evident from the more extended treatment of phenomenology in
Varela, et al., that their reasons for preferring Merleau-Ponty are concerned
with Heidegger’s  perceived hostility to science. Varela,  et al.,  claim: ‘still
Heidegger  considered  phenomenology  the  true  method  of  ontology,  a
theoretical enquiry into human existence (Dasein) that was logically prior to
any form of investigation.’83 However, in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, what is
being asked is not intended as a contradiction of scientific truth, since it is
never approached. In asking about ontology, he is asking about the sense of
Being as such, and therefore, about its existential categories (existentialia),
and not about the specific forms of interaction that may be felt by this or
that  being  within  the  modes  connected  with  the  fundamental  state  of
Being-in-the-world.84 
It  may  be  that  to  the  cognitive  scientist,  who  wishes  to  study  the
mechanism of embodied existence, Merleau-Ponty provides a more direct
interface by addressing the modalities of embodied existence directly. By
mapping the  phenomenal  ground of  embodied  experience,  he  provides  a
83 Varela, et al., 19.
84 Heidegger, op. cit., §§. 9-12.
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framework within which such analysis can take place. Nevertheless, it is not
a  point  of  necessity  that  the  body  be  explicitly  introduced  into  a
phenomenological  theory,  or  the  scientific  bases  of  phenomenological
thought be examined. Varela, et al., object that Dasein is ‘logically prior’ to
any investigation. But this is precisely the ground from which this, present,
work began; reductive reasoning seeks a ground that is not the thing itself,
for physics this is the atom, for language a definition which explains the
meaning of a word without reference to the word in question. There can be
no doubt that the roots of the fact of phenomenal perception lie in biological
structures,  what  remains  in  question  is  the  character  of  the  perceptual
nexus  that  arises  from  it  and  the  ontological  foundations  of  the  parts
expressed within it. As Heidegger states: ‘the “universality” of “Being” is not
that of a class or  genus.  The term “Being” does not define that realm of
entities which is uppermost when these are Articulated [sic] conceptually
according to genus and species’.85 The question is not of the structure of the
parts which give rise to perception itself, nor is it of the ontic structures of
daily life elaborated through the notion of embodiment, but of the way in
which  meaning,  or  qualitative  experience,  expresses  itself  in  irreducible
immanence.
85 Ibid., §. 1.
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Why  is  it  relevant  whether  Heidegger  or  Merleau-Ponty  is  to  be
preferred? The answer is one of perspectives. Heidegger’s principal fault is
the  hermetic  character  of  his  work;  Merleau-Ponty,  on  the  other  hand,
engages  willingly  with  the  sciences,  which  makes  his  theories  easily
adapted for such purposes. This can be seen, for instance, in his adoption
and  critique  of  ideas  from  Gestalt  theory  in  both  Phenomenology  of
Perception  and  Structure  of  Behaviour.86  However,  there  are  also
weaknesses in this approach when applied, as we wish to apply them, to the
ontological status of perception.
If we understand quantity/quality as we have understood them thus far,
and  ask  which  types  of  actions  are  insuperably  connected  with  a
phenomenal  ‘quality’  of  some kind,  what  is  the  result?  It  is  an  implied
consequence of the embodiment hypothesis that action,  in most cases,  is
connected to a situation, that is, an equation of immanent acting in such a
way as to produce a result.  If there is a ‘feel’  connected with an act, for
instance, removing a pen from the desk, it is to be understood ‘scientifically’
as the confluence of disparate subsystems acting temporarily in such a way
as  to  yield  an  ‘apparently’  unified  field  focused  around  the  activity  of
86 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenologie de la Perception, 44; The Structure of Behaviour, trans. Alden L. 
Fisher (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), xxv.
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picking up a pen. The force of their argument is undeniable, and it has the
virtue of possessing  truth  in the ordinary sense, but it  is not the  whole
truth. It  could be seen in a superficial light as being nearly identical to
Heidegger’s  own  views  on  the  ‘worldhood’  of  beings-within-the-world:
‘Being-in-the-world, according to our Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a
non-thematic  circumspective  absorption  in  references  or  assignments
constitutive  for  the  readiness-to-hand  of  a  totality-of-equipment.’87 It  is,
however, on closer inspection the study of something quite different to the
‘scientific’  ideas of  embodied cognition.  It  is  the analysis  of  a  lived,  real
existence  (existenz).  ‘Ready-to-hand’  and  ‘present-at-hand’,  here,  are
modalities of  Being-in-the-world. As such, they are the categories within
which objects (equipment) present themselves, but, more importantly, these
are  fundamental  categories  of  the  modes  in  which  objects  present
themselves  to  be  experienced.  This  is  the  crux  of  our  quantity/quality
notion. In whatever way the situation is examined there remain intractably
two things, seemingly incommensurable as long as reductive reasoning is
attempted, the lived simplex and the atomistic complex. 
87 Heidegger, op. cit., §. 16.
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In  neither  case  can  we  find  a  satisfactory  answer  for  the  original
question. In the case of embodied cognition, the answers which it can proffer
are  little  different  to  those  given  by  physicalists.  It  is  a  far  more
sophisticated  account  which  avoids  many  of  the  antinomic  dualities
discussed earlier, but it is not able to satisfy the problem of how qualities
emerge, as dealt with above. Searle’s input into this, that the ‘quality’ of
‘heat’ is simply the subjective appearance of molecular energies, aside from
seeming to replicate the demand of J. J. C. Smart that lightning should be
understood as an electrical discharge or pain as the firing of c-fibres (in an
overtly  more  complex  structure),  doesn’t  seem  to  aim  at  any  kind  of
explanation.88 
In  the  case  of  Heidegger,  his  fundamental  ontology  preserves  in
principle the distinction between the atomistic mode of analysis and the
phenomenological-philosophical mode. It grants an opportunity, then, for an
analysis which can act in a conciliatory way to discover an holistic ontology.
However,  there  is  no  inherent  answer  to  the  charges  of  scientific
reductionism. Whilst his fundamental ontological structure, Being-in-the-
world as the fundamental, initial and only state of the individual or Dasein,
88 The Rediscovery of the Mind, 119.
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which he elaborates in great detail, there is nothing that would  persuade
the cognitive scientist to adopt his categories and no bridge to the categories
required  by  the  scientist.  I  do,  however,  believe  that  the  concepts  of
‘worldhood’,  and the  modes  of  ‘being-within-the-world’  offer a  framework
which I will develop in my final conclusion, and which offer something of
value in attempting to determine the ontological status of perception.
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ii. The Unconscious and the Conscious in thought and 
action
The  theory  of  the  unconscious  drives,  according  to  the  school  of
psychology  known  as  psychoanalysis,  informs  many  of  the  actions  and
desires expressed by individuals both towards objects and others. If there
are involuntary actions, and if there are conflicts and tensions of reason and
unreason,  then  there  is  an  unconscious.  The  unconscious  is  to  be
understood merely as the figurative place in which those ‘thoughts’89 hide
which  inform  or  influence  conscious  thought  or  action  but  are  either
incapable of conscious expression or, by their nature, are not susceptible of
being expressed in a conscious way.90
The rudiments of Lacanian psychoanalysis can be found in Freud. The
principle categories around which all Lacanian developments resolve are to
a  greater-or-lesser  degree,  Freudian.  It  is  possible  to  see  l’imaginaire
already present  in  his  analysis  of  early  stage  (infantile)  narcissism and
object-cathexis.91 The self-reference or the recognition of aspects of a self-
image, and later, in Lacan, a mirroring, which instigates and perpetuates
89 ‘Thoughts’ here represents a general and imprecise term. It would be more accurate, though 
lengthier, to iterate the types of unconscious ‘thoughts’ most of which would not ordinarily be 
considered ‘thoughts’ in the sense in which the word is normally used. Terms such as drives (and 
their many subtypes), instincts, repressed desires, etc. ‘Thoughts’ seemed an excusable expedient. 
90 Sigmund Freud, The Unconscious, trans. Graham Frankland (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 90.
91 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. John Reddick (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 4-5.
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self-referential desires which are eventually to a degree externalized into a
desire for an object  outside of  the self  are actuated by reference to that
desire.92 Furthermore,  there  can be  seen in  the  desire  for  the  object  in
Freud, the beginnings of le réel, or the nuanced category encapsulating the
imaginary anxiety of possession, the cathexes endemic to psychic aetiology,
the negation of the self-image, and the antagonism of limitation. 
For Lacan, when Freud’s patient feels the ‘loss ‘de la fonction du réel’’, it
is  not  simply  an  objective,  manifest  reality  which  he  has  lost,  but  the
imaginary real that threatens his sense of his own self-image, his ego.93 For
Freud,  on the other hand,  it  appears  that  le  réel is  simply reality,  or  a
metaphysically actual state of affairs. It is this presumed metaphysically
actual state of affairs, which Lacan claims is never adopted as an explicit
principle but rather passively inherited through the scientific tendencies of
late  nineteenth  century  psychology,  that  Lacan  critiques  in  his  essay,
‘Beyond the “Reality Principle”’.94
According  to  Lacan,  the  concept  of  associationism,  the  mechanistic
‘engram, and the ‘associative link’ of a mental phenomenon, that is linked
92 Ibid.
93 The Unconscious, 34.
94 Jacques Lacan, ‘Beyond the “Reality Principle”’ in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink (London: W. W. Norton 
& Co., 2006), 58-74 (59). [henceforth Reality Principle].
75
to  an  object  through  experience,  produces  an  atomistic  and  objectivist
framework. He claims that this framework has retarded the experimental
progress of psychology by causing some of its results to be rejected without
full consideration. It is the presumption of associationism, he suggests, to
attempt  to  construct  an  atomistic  theory  of  stimuli  from  the  basis  of
scholastic naive materialism. The inevitable consequence of such a basis, he
argues,  is  the  adoption  of  notions  remaining  from  earlier  philosophical
periods in which, among other things, the reliability of the senses was based
on some absolute idea of fixed relations of internal and external structures.
To hallucinate, therefore, is simply to be in error.95
As  an  alternative  to  the  metaphysical  remnants  endemic  in  Freud’s
account of the ‘Reality Principle’, Lacan proposes the methodology which it
is my intention to analyse below. That is, one whose primary focus is the
meaning of the linguistic sign and to whom it signifies something. In this
essay,  which  is  instructive  in  the  fundamental  principles  to  which  he
adheres, Lacan speaks of the structure of the linguistic sign as means of
discourse, as, in one sense the analysand themselves.96 It is  through the
95 Ibid., 62-3; The suggestion from Lacan is sardonic in character. The question is not whether an 
hallucination is real or not, but whether it conforms to the structures of reality as constituted through 
the categories of the self and other (l’imaginaire, le symbolique, le réel).
96 Ibid., 66.
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work of  conversation and interlocution that the nature  of  psychoanalytic
symptoms become manifest to the analyst. 
ii.1 Lacan’s categories of the self and their relation to 
conscious perception
The self in psychoanalytic practice attains a dyadic structure with the
parent. According to J. P. Muller, the initial stage of a child’s development is
through the mirroring effect  of  an adult.97 He suggests  further that  the
interactions  of  mother and child form a rudimentary semiotic  system of
relations through which the child is able to acquire a primitive sense of
‘subjectivity’,  a kind of proto-self. For Lacan, the first stage at which the
child  is  able  to  attain  a  sense  of  ‘unity’  is  the  mirror-stage,  when  it’s
perceptive  capabilities  through  a  combination  of  natural  expansion  and
nurture are sufficiently advanced that it  can recognize itself  as  a single
body, a self. It is here too, that the first stages of an ego begin to develop: the
‘ideal-I’ and, to some degree its negation, its automatic negation, as to see
the ‘I’ or self as an object is to see another and to begin to see  the  other.
Hence, Lacan’s meaning when he declares: ‘Through these two aspects of
97 John P. Muller, Beyond the Psychoanalytic Dyad (London: Routledge, 1996), 21.
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appearance, this gestalt … symbolizes the  I’s  mental performance, at the
same time as it prefigures its alienating destination.’98
It  is  the  act  of  seeing  and associating  its  own disparate  body-image
which forms in its mind the image of a self, an I whose form unifies under
its  heading,  according  to  Lacan,  the  disparate  catalogue  of  individual
elements into a single self-force.99 The I can, on the one hand, form its own
imaginary, its ideal self-hood through its recognition that it is a self, but it
must by this token begin to see the potentially alienating forces of the other
and objects outside of its own domain of control.100 Whilst Lacan focuses
almost entirely on this mirror stage and its immanent antagonisms, others
such as Muller have cited and developed research which suggests that the
primal stage of the development of the I is the stage of ‘semiotic’ interaction,
which  takes  place  between  mother  and infant  from the  very  beginning.
Alongside this, the mirror stage introduces to the infant its first notion of
self  and  other by the means outlined in Lacan. But,  it  requires first the
undifferentiated interaction and immanent internalization of the mother’s
semiotic  interaction  with  her  child.  Adapting  Lacan’s  description  of  the
98 Lacan, ‘The  Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function’ in op. Cit., 75-81 (76).
99 Ibid., 78.
100 Ibid., 79; Also, this is similar to a concept presented by Theodore Adorno in Negative Dialectics. 
There he is critical of Hegel and Hegelian philosophies for their post-enlightenment tendency to 
want to subsume the object under their theoretical control. (1973: 146-8)
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discovery, idealization, and negation of the I, it should be understood that
the  mirror-stage  is  a  culmination  in  a  process  leading  to  this
conceptualization. The I is evident in the mother’s interactions, though not
immediately, and during the mirror-stage, the notion comes into force of ‘I’
and ‘thou’. After this stage, there is not only the fear of a new lack of this I,
but  of  the  return to  its  lack.101 The  mirror-stage,  therefore,  corresponds
loosely and simultaneously to the Freudian narcissistic and object-cathexis
stages, as expressed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. To some extent, the
above should help to answer the objections to Lacan’s mirror stage of R. A.
Lynch that the recognition of a self presupposes recognition of the other.102
That recognition is here taken as a fundamentally immanent part of the
earliest every-day experience.
ii.1.1 Le réel and le symbolique
Some elements of Lacan’s  symbolique  I will leave for the next chapter,
which will consider the issues of language, social theory, and other elements
necessary for a final look at perception in the concluding chapter. For now, I
will simply outline the essential elements of le réel,  which, as  Žižek notes,
101 Muller, Beyond the Psychoanalytic Dyad, 75.
102 Lynch, i.e.  211.
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bears many of the features of l’imaginaire owing to a variety of simultaneity
of emergence and the symbiosis of the two concepts, and le symbolique.103
S.  Žižek  describes  Lacan’s  real  as  ‘a  paradoxical,  chimerical  entity
which, although it does not exist, has a series of properties and can produce
a series of effects’.104 It is this combination of imaginary and imaginary-real
that can be seen in the mirror stage of development. The real is that which
forms  a  boundary,  or  limit,  on  the  fulfillment  of  cathexes.  It  is  not  the
metaphysical  actuality  of  Freud’s  theory,  but  the  end  of  the  domain  of
indulgence of the desires of the self: ‘When anxious, the subject is affected,
as  I  told  you,  by  the  Other’s  desire  …  The  subject  is  affected  in  an
immediate manner, which cannot be dialectized.’105 Part of the presence of
an other is the demand of the other that frustrates fantastical possession
(l’objet petit a). The sense of the falling away of this object and the anxiety
that results from this falling away brings an individual into the presence of
le réel.106
In The Function and Field of Speech in Psychoanalysis, Lacan urges that
the  particulars  of  an  analysands  speech  should  be  carefully  and
103 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 181-185,
104 Ibid., 184.
105 Lacan, ‘Introduction to the Names-of-the-Father’  in On the Name-of-the-Father, trans. Bruce Fink 
(London: Polity Press, 2013), 55-91 (57).
106 Ibid., 65-6.
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scrupulously  analysed,  that  it  is  the  part  of  the  psychoanalyst  to
comprehend  the  inexpressible  through  the  expressible  facility  of  human
cognition.107 It is here that the linguistic signifier/signified relation enters
into  Lacan’s  psychoanalytic  theorizing:  through  the  symbolic  relation  of
language,  inherently  intersubjective,  but  also  in  the  possession  and
command  of  the  individual  who  employs  it.  L’imaginaire is  thereby
extended into intersubjective relations with the other, a synthesis of  the
imaginary and the real creating a new symbolic world of the sign.108 Whilst,
as T. Eyers points out, the signifier in Lacan is removed from the certainty
it originally enjoyed in Saussure’s structuralism, it also enters here into his
notion of the symbol and the symbolic relation itself.109
In a certain, important, sense, the conception that an individual has of
themselves as a self, relies on their conception of themselves rather than a
metaphysical  entity.  It  has  been  said  above  that  the  idea  of  a  central,
processing cogito, a Cartesian or neo-classical ‘I’ as a metaphysical entity, is
redundant; conceptually, all the processes often thought of in this way can
be taken care of in a decentralized way. As Searle puts it: ‘There are a lot of
107 Lacan, ‘The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis’ in Écrits, 197-268 (221-
222). [henceforth Speech and Language]
108 Ibid., 228.
109 Tom Eyers, Lacan and the Concept of the Real (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 37.
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systems inside the body that do complicated and apparently “intelligent”
information  processing  but  have  no  mental  life  at  all.’110 Through  the
psychoanalytic  categories  of  Lacan,  and  the  initial  dyadic  structure  of
interpersonal relations becoming, later, Lacan’s symbolique, we can see how
a unified concept of ‘one’s own self’ is possible.
110 Searle, ‘The Connection Principle and the Ontology of the Unconscious: A reply to Fodor and 
Lepore’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 (1994), 847-855 (848).
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IV
The Roles of Language and
Social Interaction in the
Structure of the ‘I’
In the previous chapter, I briefly discussed the nature of the signifier with
regards to the views of Lacan. Here, I will expand more fully on the role of
language,  and  more  specifically,  on  linguistic  structure  and  the
fundamentally interpersonal essence of the speech act as a strong influence
on qualitative perception of the world as a whole. I will draw not only on
Lacan’s  interpretation  of  the  analytical  dialogue,  between  analyst  and
analysand, but also on M. M. Bakhtin and V. N. Vološinov to show how a
naturally evolving linguistic dialogue is fundamental to any social  group
and ultimately influential on how those groups perceive the ‘qualities’ with
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which they become acquainted as a member of that group. I will then turn,
finally,  to  the problem of  social  structure  and social  interaction,  as  both
informative in itself and inextricably dependent on the nature of linguistic
dialogue.  Within  the  remit  of  this  discussion  will  be  the  structural
anthropology of  C.  Lévi-Strauss  and also  the  social  theory  of  Althusser;
from Lévi-Straus’ essay ‘The Effectiveness of Symbols’ and L. Althusser’s
interpolation  of  Lacan’s  psychoanalytic  categories  in  ‘Ideology  and
Ideological  State  Apparatuses’,  I  will  argue  that  the  structure  of  an
organized self represents the interpolated structure of the society in which
they exist. As perceiving entities, these facets of life inform an ‘I’, which,
whilst it may appear independent, and, as I will show below, as free as any
element in a system composed of a finite number of variables, it is immured
within a socio-linguistic structure that, in an analogical sense, is the thing
itself.
As a propositum minor, it might be tentatively suggested that whenever
a syllable is uttered, it is done so under the duress of conditions on which
the  utterer  depends  so  completely  for  their  being  that  they  are,  for  all
intents  and purposes,  utterly  insuperable.  In  order  for  something  to  be
meaningfully  spoken  aloud,  there  are  several  essential  presuppositions
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whose conditions need first to have been met. Firstly, there must already
exist a conceptual framework in which a speech act is framed. In order for
speech to occur there needs to be a structure of belief in which an individual
is constituted within some state of being that enables them to conceive of
more  than  would  be  possible  on  an  undifferentiated,  purely  instinctual,
level. While this certainly requires a great deal more evidential argument, I
take  the  principle  from  the  position  that  the  conscious  being  of  an
individual is constituted beyond their inherent faculties.
 Secondly,  the  speech  act  presupposes  not  only,  as  F.  de  Saussure
suggests  ‘at  least  two  individuals’,111 but  generalized  social  interaction
whose complexity is measured as a function of time and the extent of the
network  represented  by  its  social  structure.  This,  I  will  take  to  be  the
principal argument of Bakhtin/ Vološinov’s socio-linguistic theories.
Thirdly, a relation needs to exist between the speaker and the listener
that renders the concepts and ideas expressed by speech intelligible to both
speaker and listener; were this condition not met, then, as I will elaborate
below, even with a phonemic and graphemic structure that is identical in
every way, the words which they form will be unintelligible.
111    Ferdinand de Saussure, A Course in General Linguistics, trans. Roy Harris (London: Duckworth, 
1983), 11.
85
Below, I will fully explicate the need for these conditions, and show how
they  can  be  satisfied  through  those  theories  and  concepts  that  I  have
outlined  in  the  first  paragraph.  This  demonstration  is  an  essential
preliminary to the main aim of this chapter, which is to show how language
and  social  interaction  inform  the  structure  of  the  ‘I’  and,  thereby,  the
perception of ‘qualities’.
i. Signifier and signified as constitutive of symbolic 
relations and Bakhtin/Vološinov’s neutral sign as 
introducing plasticity to the meanings of signs.
The twentieth-century structuralist and post-structuralist paradigmata,
although  with  some  antecedents  in  earlier  social  theories  such  as  E.
Durkheim,  and,  depending  on  interpretation,  K.  Marx,  has  as  its  chief
influence the posthumously published work of Ferdinand de Saussure. I will
provide a brief outline of Saussure’s linguistics as represented in Course in
General Linguistics  in order that when we present the notions of Bakhtin
and Vološinov’s theories their impetus and the reasons for preferring them
will be clear. 
For Saussure, the speech act is represented by the duality of the sign.
The division is between sign as physical form and conceptual realization, or,
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between the physical form of the sign and its psychological signified. Thus,
for a standard sentence as a function of some phonological pattern  S(a),
there exists a psychological/conceptual referent such that C(a) satisfies the
conceptual  conditions  of  S(a):  S(a)   C(a).⟶ 112 With  this  framework,
Saussure suggests  that  a communication network of  at  least  two people
creates a reflexive relation between physical and physiological elements on
the  one  hand,  and  conceptual  and  psychological  on  the  other  that  can
continue to cycle between them indefinitely.113
The connection between the signifier and signified is  a relation fixed,
according  to  Saussure,  by  the  forces  of  the  existing  psychological
associations, history, and the arbitrary connections between a phonological
pattern and a concept. These connections belong to the ‘social’ part of the
language  and stand beyond the  capacity  for  any individual  to  create  or
modify.114 Saussure’s structure is one of permanence and impermanence in
a state of as close to equilibrium as possible. The  langue or interpersonal
rules governing the conceptual associations of a language are moderated by
language in the act of being spoken given to varying degrees of competency,
112 This description differs from Saussure in one respect, that is, in representing the phonological pattern
as a function of a sentence; however, it is difficult to see any normative situation in which it would 
not be so represented.
113 Saussure, 12.
114 Ibid., 14.
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differences  in  pronunciation,  idiomatic  variations,  etc.  The  language  is,
thereby,  an edifice that cannot be affected willfully  by any individual  or
group of  individuals,  but whose symbolic  relations remain statically and
rigidly  determined  by  extra-personal  and  extra-communal  forces.115 
i.1 The ideological sign and the plasticity of the meaning 
of the linguistic signifier.
The symbolic, or in Vološinovian terminology, ideological relation, is the
relation  that  subsists  between  the  object  and  its  apprehension  in  the
sociological  milieu.  The  symbolic,  as  Lacan  notes,  constitutes
intersubjective relations by allowing the imaginary of the self-sense to be
extended  into  general  associations  with  the  other.116 Similarly,  Vološinov
suggests  that  the  ideological  sign  ‘reflects  and  refracts  another  reality
outside  itself’.117 The  variety  of  symbols  is  confined  by  the  variety  of
relations into which individuals enter. There can be no direct association,
unmediated by multifarious social facts. Whilst Saussure may have created
the  idea  of  the  structural  symbol,  in  this  sense,  as  part  of  a  broader
structural hierarchy which determines aspects of the behaviour, beliefs, and
115 Ibid., 71-4.
116 Lacan, Language and Speech, 229.
117 Valentin V. Vološinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. 
Titunik  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 9.
88
spoken  words  of  individuals,  he  has  nevertheless  been  criticized  for  his
insistence that the relation between the signifier and signified was fixed and
immutable. This, and the arbitrary negativity of his theory of the sign, lead
Vološinov,  Bakhtin,  and  Lacan  to  employ  the  symbolism  of  the
signifier/signified  relation  in  a  different  way.  Arguably  approaching  the
nature  of  Derrida’s  critique,  Vološinov  intimates  that  this  structure  has
reified an abstraction from the coalescence of different voices, and made
primary  what  is  at  best  secondary.118  Vološinov  thereby  intends  to
establish, firstly, the priority of the base in determining linguistic forms and
meaning, and secondly, the fluidity of the structure through interaction and
dialogue.
Moreover,  Vološinov  argues  that  the  utterance  belongs  to  the
immanence  of  the  social  interaction,  more  than  to  the  possession  of  an
objective  compendium  of  inherent  ‘normatively  self-identical’  linguistic
forms.119 Against the notion of individualistic subjectivism he proposes an
interpretation of the sign as a sociological element and a socially normative
instrument of the utterance. There can be no such thing as an ‘abstract
addressee’ lacking all social conditioning and relations to others since, in
118 Ibis., 66; Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorti Spivak (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1976), 133-5.
119 Vološinov, 67.
89
such circumstances, there could never be any common ground on which to
base the slightest comprehension.120
Vološinov’s linguistic theory is a fecund theory replete with suggestive
concepts, and this exposition of his contraposition to Saussurian linguistic
structuralism  cannot  represent  the  entirety  of  his  theory,  but  perhaps
enough  has  been  accomplished  in  the  above  explication  to  allow  us  to
present a critical  examination of  the  nature  of  the  ideological  sign.  The
nature  of  the  sign  in  Vološinov’s  theory  is  distinctly  anti-idealistic.  He
requires  of  it  three  essential  qualities:  first,  that  the  sign  may  not  be
‘divorced’ from ‘the material reality of sign [sic]’; second, that the sign ‘may
not be divorced from the concrete forms of social intercourse [sic]’; and third,
that ‘Communication and the forms of communication may not be divorced
from the material basis [sic]’.121 The sign’s symbolic or ‘ideological’ character,
for Vološinov, lies in the nature of the interaction. Similarly to the nature of
the linguistic sign in Lacan, Vološinov maintains that the sign’s entrance
into concrete reality for any individual depends upon its essential quality of
being  socialized.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  totality  of  signs  in
structuralism and post-structuralism  become  the concrete reality, the real
120   Also, Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. 
Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), §243.
121 Vološinov,  21.
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as experienced through it’s relation with the imaginary. The real, beyond
the structure of signifiers and signifieds retains a noumenal relationship to
the system of signs. It is the real that doesn’t exist, but which makes the
symbolic merely symbolic.
Vološinov attempts to produce here a notion which is distinctly beyond
the fixed and immutable relations, proposed by Saussure, between a real
concrete  sound  pattern  and  psychological  association  of  the  conceptual
equivalent from the sound pattern. Whilst it would not be denied that there
are relations of an essentially physically correlative nature, the realization
of post-structural philosophies such as those of Lacan and Vološinov122 is
that not only are the relations of signifier and signified flexible to a large
degree but that within the structure of language and its symbols, no actual
base reality beyond these structures is available to the actors within the
system.
122 It seems possible that one of the reasons for Vološinov’s apparent production of a post-structural 
before this idea had become popular in European philosophy notion of signified and signifier in 
fluid, plastic relationships with each and undergoing the revisions of discourse is his explicitly 
declared intention of producing a Marxian philosophy of linguistics which implies the rejection of 
the fixed and immutable laws sustaining the epistemic structure of capital.
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i.2 Dialogue as the basis for diachronic linguistic 
variation, and the self-relational quality of signification. 
The meaning of the sign as quality par excellence.
The question remains after Vološinov’s argument about the more precise
nature of variation within the meanings of the sign and its significance for
the nature of qualitative experience in general. I believe that the notion of
speech genres  developed by Mikhail  M. Bakhtin may help with the more
thorough understanding of these concepts that it  is the intention of this
subsection to achieve. The idea of a speech genre, adopted from the concept
of the literary genre, suggests that communities and groups, sections, and
identities with those communities through the repeated endogenous acts of
speech  and  meaning  developed  within  their  shared  experiences  and
concerns  creates  the  appearance  of  genres of  speech  within  a  single
language where  there  is  great  variation  in the use  and meaning of  the
linguistic sign. He defines the concept of speech genre thus: ‘Each separate
utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used
develops its own relatively stable type of these utterances. These we may
call speech genres.’123
123 Mikhail M. Bakhtin, ‘The Problem of Speech Genres’ in Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, 
trans. Vern W. McGee, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Texas: University of Texas Press, 
1986), 60-102 (60). [henceforth Speech Genres]
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These genres, according to Bakhtin, are almost infinitely numerous and
utterly  heterogeneous.  They  involve  all  aspects  of  speech  from  ‘daily
rejoinders’  to ‘the brief standard military command’.124 Within the varied
structure  of  speech  genres  in  general,  there  are  substructures  and
variations.  Many  such  variations  are  derived  from  daily  colloquial
interactions within certain groups of individuals employing the linguistic,
written and verbal,125 genres appropriate to their situations. Similarly to
Vološinov, he also considers that the meanings of signs can vary opposition,
or  as  a  result  of  antagonism between  classes  of  speakers  and with  the
variation of the linguistic sign would also come variation in the meaning of
symbolic  relations  between  individuals  and  their  objects.  Through  this
method, attempts for any superstructure to enforce a kind of monoglossia or
to dictate the ways in which daily experience should be understood will
invariably be met with heteroglossic failure.126  
This multiplicity of meanings, through antagonisms and, as he puts it,
‘centripetal and centrifugal’ forces, suggests, not perhaps an infinite variety
in the sign, for its meanings are contained within a number of structures,
124 Ibid.
125 To a degree, avoiding Derrida’s indictment of Saussure for prioritizing speech over writing and 
treating writing as an inferior discipline taking all its advantages from speech.
126 Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’ in The Dialogic Imagination, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael 
Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist (Texas: University of Texas Press, 1981), 269-434 (271-2). 
[henceforth Discourse]
93
which, though malleable, are sufficient to ensure the commonality within
the  same  language  necessary  for  communications  and  to  constrain  the
variability of meanings by the specific dynamics of the variability of signs
and  the  shared  experience  of  the  community  of  speakers,  but  there  is
nevertheless heteroglossic variety within and between dialogic communities
of' the same ‘unitary’ language.127
But what is  ‘meaning’  in this  context?  It  is  not  the ‘meaning’  of  the
‘identity-sign’,  or  the  ‘correspondence  theory  of  truth’  understanding  of
what it is to mean something. That ‘a’, a statement or belief, means ‘b’, an
external  state  of  affairs,  if,  and only if,  ‘a’  corresponds  to  ‘b’.  As Searle
suggests in his book, The Construction of Social Reality: 
‘”Correspond to the facts” is just a shorthand for the variety of
ways  in  which  true  statements  can  accurately  represent  how
things  are,  and  that  variety  is  the  same  as  the  variety  of
statements,  ,  or  more strictly  speaking the variety of  assertive
speech acts.’128 
Searle  indicates,  furthermore,  that  truth  should  be  directly  measured
according to  its  accuracy in relation to  some state  of  affairs.129 In other
words, there are objective facts, statements about objective facts, and the
127 Ibid., 428.
128 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (London: Penguin, 1995), 213.
129 Ibid., 214-5.
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relation  aRb  (see  above).130 Here,  again,  there  is  an  example  of  the
subjective/objective approach to literal truth critiqued in chapter two; it is
the regarding of one type, the scientific, as possessing automatic priority
over any other.131 Such a notion is ‘literally’ true, but it does not necessarily
mean what its proponents suggest that it should mean, or that it represents
the  totality  of  the  possibility  of  truth  under  those  conditions.  If  the
linguistic  theory  of  symbolic  relations  just  discussed  in  this  and  the
previous chapter is correctly understood, it is that words and phrase, their
meaning as signification, their structural relations, and signifier/signified
relationship, are not atomic elements whose components are relatable to
similarly atomic components of external reality. Such a construction would
make no sense under the above paradigm. 
In an important sense, ‘meaning’ here, whilst not denying the existence
of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ perspectives as such, does not subscribe to any
theory  which  subsumes  one  or  other  under  the  other’s  paradigm,  or
prioritizes one over the other, or adopts a notion of truth which attempts the
literal relation of the one to the other. According to correspondence theory,
130 I am not thinking of Wittgenstein here. Simply a standard relation between the statement and its state
of affairs. This is no doubt a simplification, but, as necessary as it is to include this illustration, it is 
not central to our thesis that full exposition of Searle’s position be included.
131 Cf. Searle’s discussion p. 213 of the ‘approximate’ distance of the Sun from the Earth. It is, literally, 
true in scientific terms. But the correspondence theory itself is limited to this kind of truth and 
attempts to reduce all other kinds to degrees to which they compare to an ‘objective’ state of affairs.
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there are degrees of reality moving towards the precise calculation of states
of  affairs  and their  natural  forces.  This  is  the  simplistic  division  of  the
subjective and objective senses of ‘quality’ and ‘quantity’ to which I referred
in chapter two, which retains many of the aspects of the classical model;
although, Searle at least recognizes some of these concerns, as mentioned in
that chapter. 
From the linguistic perspective, there is no clear atomistic relation of
‘word’ and ‘object’. That is not, of course, the same as saying that no such
correlation  can  ever  exist.  But  the  immanent  relations  of  symbols
predominate  in  such  a  way  that  the  ‘meaning’  of  any  sentence,  unless
constructed  in  an  explicitly  propositional  way,  rarely  has  a  directly
corresponding  object  that  can  be  taken  as  its  complete  meaning.  The
isolation of a single noun and stating that it relates to this ‘material object’
is  not the same as stating that  all  sentences with an ‘assertive’  content
correspond to a literal state of affairs, or that this state of affairs is not
itself reliant for its being in some way on the symbols which purport to
represent  it.  I  take  this  position  based  on  a  reading  of  Lacan,
Bakhtin/Vološinov, and Heidegger. Through a reading of these thinkers, it is
possible to see how a qualitative perceptual framework is, at least, possible;
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and, how ‘meaning’, which would be an objective relation in the sciences, is
relative  to  the  perspectives  both  individual/imaginary  and
intersubjective/symbolic.  Moreover,  it  is  the  relations  themselves  that
obtain ‘meaning’ in and through those relations, which are immanent for an
individual  who  finds  them  preexisting  and  has  no,  even  theoretical,
existence independent from this  Da,  or, ‘there’, of Being-in-the-world, and
thus  appear  to  the  individual  who  comes  across  them  as  absolute  or
objective truths.
i.3 Symbolic interactions as the essential, basic and 
insuperable mode of interrelation as such.
I do not intend to accept all of the conclusion of the notions of symbolic
interactionism, the social psychological theory developed principally by E.
Goffman; however, there could be an argument to be made that a natural
corollary for treating linguistic dialogue as a symbolic interaction of sorts is
that there should be a more general notion in which almost all elements of
the individual are constructed by the force of social elements. This is the
purport of Goffman’s essay ‘on face-work’.132
132 Erving Goffman, ‘On Face-work: An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction’ in 
Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face to Face Behavior (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), 5-45.
97
Goffman  suggests  that  individuals  interacting  within  a  society  and
within  specific  social  groups  within  a  society  adopt  a  series  of  ‘faces’
appropriate to the situation, and appropriate to the way that it seems to
them they ought to be perceived by another. A ‘face’, according to Goffman,
is: ‘the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the
line others assume he has taken during a particular contact.’133 To be ‘in
face’ here is to be approximating social expectations within the context of
operation,  or  to  be  behaving,  generally,  in  a  way  consonant  with
maintaining a particular ‘face’. The face is a means by which individuals
become a social part of a grouping; to maintain this situation, and avoid
being cast out of a particular grouping,  is  to exist within the strictures of
the  requisite  ‘face’.  It  is  not  the  case  that  there  is  necessarily,  except
perhaps  in  certain  supervenient  circumstances,  an  intention  to  adopt  a
‘face’, rather it is integral to social interaction as a whole. The maintenance
of ‘face’ Goffman regards as ‘a condition of interaction, not its objective.’134
Under the structure of what Goffman calls ‘face-work’, the individual
must  work  to  maintain  ‘face’  in  any  number  of  social  conditions.  All
varieties of social interaction involve ‘face’ and ‘face-work’ to some degree.
133 Ibid., 5.
134 Ibid., 12.
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The structure essentially forces the subsumption of the individual under the
paradigm of the interaction or social situation. ‘Face-work’ is of the greatest
social  significance  to  the  individual  for,  to  maintain  ‘face’,  according  to
Goffman, is  to  maintain such elements as the impression of competence,
suitability, etc. Goffman outlines two primary kinds of ‘face-work’. The first
is ‘the avoidance process’ or the means by which a conflict or offence can be
avoided in the first place and ‘face’  maintained by avoiding the event or
events that would have challenged it. For example, if a situation cannot be
escaped altogether then an individual  may act as  though no offence has
been offered.135 ‘The corrective process’ is required if a potential loss cannot
be avoided and a threat to ‘face’ takes place. For Goffman, the corrective
process betokens a ritual of ‘interchange’, or, a process involving two or more
actors  and  which  he  regards  as  possessing  a  high  degree  of  symbolic
character. For instance, in the exchange: ‘”Excuse me!” and, “Certainly,”’.136
There  is  a  sense  in  which  any  discussion  of  the  self  beyond  its
presentation exceeds the scope of Goffman’s  proposal.  Whilst  the idea of
‘face’ and ‘face-work’ are suggestive, there are also respects in which they
are to be found wanting. For Goffman, the ‘face’ is more like a mask, and an
135 Ibid., 15=18.
136 Ibid., 19-24.
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implicit duality between the mask and the mask-wearer is maintained. As
such the construction of self is partly a willed process, a concealment and
an active  engagement  within  a  social  milieu;  there  is  also  a  sense of  a
presentation of a ‘self’ being evinced, which I will discuss below. All social
interaction  forms  symbolic  play  to  a  degree;  the  self,  the  ‘true’  self,  is
beyond  the  reach  of  any  appearance  in  a  social  context.137 As  Goffman
suggests, the actions of a group who are no longer acting out a particular
social performance are themselves a different kind of performance.138 There
are some structures from later additions to symbolic interactionist theory
that  I  will  consider  before  showing  how  this  contributes  to  our  idea  of
qualitative perception.
R.  T.  Serpe  proposes  in  extension to  Goffman’s  concepts,  an  explicit
identity theory: ‘Identity theory emphasises the relationship between self,
society … and role performance.’139 In essence, the theory proposed by Serpe
suggests, similarly to Goffman’s, that ‘identity’, or manifest self as the only
observable phenomenon, is  a function of the structure of social  relations
and  the  degree  to  which  any  individual  is  subjected  to  two  primary
137 I do not mean to suggest here any crude Cartesian notion pertaining to Goffman’s theories. I merely 
point out that there is the performative aspect, and the self that feels the urge ‘to perform’. (Ibid., 
44).
138 Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life  (London: Penguin Books, 1969), 202.
139 Richard T, Serpe, ‘Stability and Change ins Self: A Structural Symbolic Interactionist Exploration’, 
Social Psychology Quarterly, 50 (1987), 44-55 (44).
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categories, those being: commitment and choice. Under commitment, there
is:  interactive  commitment,  which  indicates  the  ‘number  of  social
relationships associated with a given identity’, and affective commitment,
which indicates the ‘”intensiveness” or affect attached to the potential loss
of social relationships’.140 ‘Choice’ informs the meaning of these interactions
through the deciding process of committing or not committing to a given
interaction.  As  Serpe suggests:  ‘Choice  is  conceptualized  ...  as  reflecting
constraints which operate on any given set of identities.’141
The final category to be considered within the paradigm of symbolic
interactionism is  that  of  ‘altercasting’.  This  is  the  mechanism by which
individuals within a social structure are encouraged by others within the
structure to adopt specific attitudes,  postures,  or dispositions,  i.e.  ‘faces’.
The concept of ‘altercasting’ supplies the original theory of Goffman’s with
an explanation of the ways in which social structure operates to inform the
structure of a performative self, thus: ‘It is only recently … that greater
recognition has been given to the idea that people bring personal purposes
into interaction.’142 Weinstein and Deutschberger regard the performance of
an actor as the expression of the synthetic realization of the intentional
140 Ibid., 45.
141 Ibid., 46.
142 Eugene A. Weinstein and Paul Deutschberger, ‘Some Dimensions of Altercasting’, Sociometry, 26 
(1963), 454-466 (454).
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roles of the actor, the attitude of the other in the situation, and the general
social structure of the situation. They criticize Goffman for being unclear in
his representation of the responsibilities of the performer and the one who
witnesses  the  performance.143 Essentially,  they  are  recognizing  an
additional layer of confinement on the behaviour of an actor within a social
structure. Such an actor is confined, firstly, by the expectations of the others
within  the  social  structure,  secondly,  by  the  interplay  of  ‘choice’  and
‘commitment’  as  described  above,  and  thirdly,  by  the  interpersonal
interaction  itself  and  the  dimensions  within  it  of  what  Weinstein  and
Deutschberger refer to as ‘Ego’ and ‘Alter’, and which role is accepted in a
particular circumstance.
There is, here, a degree to which the novelty with which these ideas are
presented  is  overstated.  They  are  illustrative  in  the  sense  that  they
represent the social confinements of being from an ontic perspective, but
they  nonetheless  appear  to  reinterpret  ordinary  social  conventions  in  a
language that contributes very little more to the conception than if it were
described in colloquial language. Perhaps this can be attributed to its being
a theory of social psychology, and the need to represent within that field a
certain quantitative aspect and theoretical aspect in order to demonstrate
143 Ibid., 456.
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association  commonly  taken  for  granted.  It  does,  however,  present  an
opportunity for the expansion of the symbolic analyses conducted above.
As a basic fact of interrelation, it is assumed that there is in every case
an  obstacle  to  the  complete  satisfaction  of  the  ‘imaginary’
(Lacanian/Mullerian) cathexes by the presence of the other, or, in symbolic
interactionist parlance ‘Alter’. The self and other, in meeting, are formed by
the structures which predominate in their situation. A combination of the
Lacanian subject, his ‘imaginary’ and ‘symbolic’ categories intact, with the
social  interactionist  dynamics  modifying  the  structure  of  the  self  in  the
multifarious  possible  ways  implied above  can be  suggested.  When taken
together, these concepts allow for a self, which, adopting a perspective on
itself may believe in the permanence and immutability of its structures, but
in reality has a locus outside of its own sphere of personal control. It could
be  suggested,  though  in  the  succeeding  chapter,  that  the  belief  in
permanence itself arises firstly, from the fear of the self dissolving discussed
in relation  to  Lacanian categories  in  the  last  chapter  and secondly,  the
sense of concern for one’s own being which Heidegger illustrates in  Sein
und Zeit.
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It  still  remains for us to show how the confluence of forces within a
social structure influences the self directly. In what has been shown above,
the  behaviour  of  the  self  is  directed  by  social  forces,  those  forces  are
impelled by a more general structure but the elements of that structure not
relating to the ontic and normative forms are not discussed by Goffman,
Serpe, Weinstein or Deutschberger. Whilst I will discuss in the following
section  an  illustrative  example  of  social  structure  and  its  relations  to
psychological  categories  through  Althusser’s  structural  Marxism.  This
should not necessarily be understood as an adoption of that theory.
As I will make clear, the general point can be made without conceding
every element to Althusser’s  understanding. In particular, it  is not clear
what his unqualified references to a general base and superstructure would
mean practically  as  these  categories  appear to  suggest  an homogeneous
group,  around which certain perspectives and purposes gather.  It  is  not
central to this thesis and so I will not develop this point as fully as it has
been developed elsewhere;144 however, it should be noted that the ontological
structure does not need to represent a normatively homogeneous collection.
Althusser,  incidentally,  claims  that  the  base  and  superstructure  can  be
defined by regarding the base as the structured relations of the ‘economic
144   Frederic Jameson, Valences of the Dialectics (London: Verso, 2009).
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base:  the  forces  of  production  and  the  relations  of  production’  and  the
superstructure to be the ‘State and all the legal, political and ideological
forms’.145 Certainly, Althusser acknowledges difficulties in an homogeneous
sense  of  the  base  and  superstructure,  proposing  a  multiplicity  of
contradictions  eventually  focussing  into  a  ‘unity’  and  coalescing  into
‘revolutionary rupture’.146 But, if this is true then the  structure,  economic
base, is contingent at best, and so it remains even then unclear how it can
form part of the fundamental (pre-revolutionary) social structure. The base
only  exists  when  certain,  unlikely,  conditions  conspire  momentarily  to
create  it.
145 Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Verso, 1969), 111.
146 Ibid., 99-100.
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ii. The ideological-symbolic relation of the sign through 
the immanent psychological categories of the ‘imaginary’ 
and ‘real’ as represented through a social structural 
edifice.
To some extent, Althusser accepts many of the conclusions that have
already been drawn above concerning the nature of symbolic ‘reality’. The
duality of the sign as both ‘real’ (symbolic) and ‘unreal’ (real), or, at least,
the duality insofar as, if the sign has at bottom a physical correlate it can
never be objectively apprehended as such, but only through the manner of
its entrance into the symbolic relations of the linguistic and physical system
of  signs.  This  system  is  apprehended  in  Althusser  through  a  general
sociological  perspective.  He  suggests  that  ideology,  in  general,  as  a  pre-
revolutionary  phenomenon  is  a  ‘representational’  device  through  which
individuals represent their ‘real’ conditions ‘to themselves’.147 Ideology, for
Althusser, primarily ‘distorts’ the individual’s true reality; it manufactures
through the presentation of hopeful elements purporting to represent truth
a false image, and imaginary distortion of the ‘real’ conditions.148
In  Althusser’s  understanding  of  ideology,  it  is  realized  through
multifarious  ‘Ideological  State  Apparatuses’.  Through  religious,  ethical,
legal, political, aesthetic, etc., i.e., according to Althusser, superstructural,
147 Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and State Apparatuses’.
148 Ibid.
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various ideological positions are to be realized. These positions generally
fulfill the purpose of the ideological interpellation of the subject. That is,
the  rendering  of  the  subject  within  a  certain  ideological-symbolic
interactional  sphere  of  enacting  specific  roles.  Ideology  interpellates  the
subject; that is, it acts upon and through the subject and the subject thereby
constitutes itself as subject of an ideological disposition. The ‘category of the
subject is constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function
… of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects.’149 
It  is  by  this  mechanism,  Althusser  argues,  that  the  individual  is
transformed into the subject, into the subject of ideology. In the sense in
which Althusser claims that ideology is interpellation, or, what is the same
thing,  the  means  by  which  interpellation  takes  place,  this  is  the
transmission of the superstructure through the strata of social structure. It
could be disputed whether such a monolithic exercise can be conceived as
deliberate design, or even as coincidental process concerned only with the
station of those involved in such a concept. However, there is a kernel here
that is of use to our present purposes; it is not particularly relevant whether
or not the application to which it is put in Althusser’s work is accurate or
not  and therefore  I  do not  propose to spend any time investigating it.  I
149 Ibid.
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propose instead to show how Althusser has interpolated Lacan, and then to
show its practical relevance to a study of qualitative perception.
For  Althusser,  the  original  Lacanian  categories  we  have  reviewed
become  categories  of  domination  by  the  elements  of  the  distinct
superstructure. Ideology is the means by which the superstructural forces
discover that the subject can be interpellated without the need for force to
be applied except in a few rare instances of ‘bad subjects’.150 These subjects
are persuaded through the ‘imaginary distortion’  of  ideology to work for
themselves,  and  to  believe  that  it  truly  is  for  themselves.151 Ideology  is
communicated through the ‘material’ base; it is the fundamental mode of
being within the non-revolutionary state.152
The significant notion here is the quality of this ‘imaginary distortion’
and its principle mode of communication through the individuals, avoiding
unnecessary theoretical abstractions. In a sense, the abstraction arising out
of the communication of many individuals within the social structure as a
whole  forms  the  distinct  superstructural  edifice  that  supervenes  on  the
economic  base  but  also  reflect  and  refract  back  upon  it  to  produce  the
ideological state of the base in relation to its own inevitable abstraction of
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
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principles of control. As A. Callinicos has also suggested: ‘Factors such as
national  traditions  and  political  and  ideological  institutions  are  not  the
mere epiphenomena of the economy, passive reflections of the development
of the productive forces.’153 It is, in one sense, similar to Lacan’s ‘symbolic’.
The  interpellative  function  of  ideology  takes  place  through  and  within
socialization and interaction.154 It is, perhaps, not difficult to see how this
can present  a more general  notion of  the  sociological  effects  of  symbolic
relation on the formation and structure of the individual within a structural
framework. 
Through ideology, the sense of self becomes a being that is, in theory at
least,  capable  of  possessing  the  qualities  and  characters  generally
associated with it without the abstract internal structures of the classical
model inhering within it. Althusser’s subject exists in society as both,  in
principle, subject qua subject,155 and subject as actual, interpellated subject.
153 Alex Callinicos, Is there a Future for Marxism? (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1972), 60.
154 Althusser, op. cit.
155 The ‘real’ which never existed, but does, at least in principle, exist as a theoretical entity, and 
imaginary contra-imaginary, so to speak; Cf.  Žižek (op. cit.  181-2).
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ii.1 Lacan, Lévi-Strauss, Althusser – Structural parity 
and disparity.
To a degree, a large portion of what has been said so far could be read
as an implicit  criticism of the Hegelian/Marxian structuralism of Claude
Lévi-Strauss. His rigid structure of Hegelian dialectical oppositions of the
form: ‘thesis, antithesis, synthesis’ represents an initial influence for Lacan;
however, over time, as J. Rabaté notes, he diverged from this position.156 In
his  analysis  of  Freud’s  case,  Dora,  it  is  possible  to  see  his  original
adaptation of Hegelian notions along the same lines as  Lévi-Strauss. Here,
Lacan adopts Hegel’s notion of the ‘beautiful soul’, someone unaffected and
apart  from  the  symbolic  connections  and  interrelations  of  broader
socialization.157 
Lacan,  unlike  Lévi-Strauss  requires  structures  that  are  ultimately
beyond  a  straightforward  objective/subjective  categorization.  He  advises
that there be no structure without a subject,  and it is in the  immanent
meanings of interactions that structures are to be found; it is not through
an  analysis  of  the  structures  of  meanings  that  interactions  are  to  be
understood, except insofar as those structures have been created by the self-
156 Jean-Michel Rabaté, ‘Lacan’s Dora Against Lévi-Strauss’, Yale French Studies, 123 (2013), 129-144 
(133-4).
157 Ibid., 134; Lacan, ‘Presentation on Transference’ in op. cit., 176-185 (179).
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same  forces  whose  interactions  they  represent.  To  some  extent,  Rabaté
suggests,  Lacan  would  accept  Derrida’s  indictment  of  Lévi-Strauss;158
although, as Eyers and Žižek have noted, whilst Lacan does not accept the
strictures of the fixed application of the signified in Saussurian linguistics,
he is not a full Derridan post-structuralist either.159
158  Rabaté, 143-4.
159  Žižek, 181-5; Eyers, 18.
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VConclusion: 
The Immanent Meaning of
Structured Perception
It  has been the principal intention behind the present work to reconcile
several  different  conceptions  of  the  relation  of  self  to  world  without
elimination or reduction of those categories which are evidenced in common
experience.  The  materialists  have  sought  to  explain  the  phenomena  of
subjective  experience  by  reducing  them  solely  to  material-scientific
explananda.  Their  efforts  have  focused,  in  this  way,  on  attempting  to
reconcile  the  actual states of affairs as they appear in practice with the
ideal states  that  their  interpretation  of  scientific  phenomena  suggests
ought to  be  the  case  were their  ontologies  correctly  theorized.  Whilst  it
would be unsupportable to deny the value of  empirical  and quantitative
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scientific  research  on  its  own  terms,  practically  and  theoretically,
materialism, and in a different way, John Searle and Daniel Dennett, would
seek to reduce the ontological categories of experience to the categories of
scientific explanation. Even as he rejects materialism for its retention of
Cartesian categories, which leads to the belief in the necessity of discarding
or limiting mental events, Searle adopts a theory of truth (correspondence
theory)  that measures degrees of reality/truth according as they tend to
correspond to scientific categories.
In  chapter  two,  I  argued  for  an  interpretation  of  the  dichotomy  of
‘quality’  and ‘quantity’  that avoids the traditional sense of ‘subjective’  as
qualitative and ‘objective’ as quantitative. For, that distinction relies on an
inaccurate  sense of  the  categories  of  ‘quantity’  and ‘quality’;  there  is  no
sense in which the categories of scientific investigation lie outside of the
general  categories  of  experience  themselves.  It  is  only  from  within  the
experiential meanings of the words ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ that an objective
quantitative analysis can be opposed to a subjective qualitative analysis.
These are never, however, discrete realms of which it can be said the one,
subjective,  is  interpretive  and by its  nature  less  reliable than the other,
objective, quantitative, empirical and data-driven. If this is so under certain
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paradigmatic states, it is because the perspective governed by the object of
analysis and its orientation in relation to the one who studies it demands
that level of analysis. It is not, as I demonstrated previously, an absolute
division  of  reality  and  its  interpretation  by  an  ‘observer’  of  some
description.  Even  such a  division  would,  to  some extent,  presuppose  an
ontology  predicated  on  the  separation  of  mind  and  matter,  the  only
resolution  to  which  being,  as  Kim  has  suggested,  eliminativism,
reductionism, or by implication, dualism. 
Against  the background of antinomic oscillations between the various
logically  coherent  positions  in  materialism  and  dualism;  and  scientific
conceptions which mistake the status to which their own subject belongs.
The understanding of a preexisting conceptual apparatus on which to found
a general theory of perception is absent. It has, therefore, been necessary to
attempt to construct an ontological framework consonant with our analysis
of the perspectival nature of the relations of ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’,
within which the potential  ontological structure of qualitative experience
and its features.
Whilst phenomenological analysis has a certain value in analysing the
relations, lived experience, and categories of ordinary experience, it is, as
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discussed at length above, unable to answer the objection of the empirical
scientist who claims that its analyses are irrelevant for an investigation into
the  true  nature  of  perception,  and  that  they  presuppose  the  ‘real’
quantitative base from which all experience derives (cf. Varela,  et al.,  for
instance).  Again,  as  a  result  of  the  empirical  scientific  perspective,  the
categories  of  experience  and  those  of  the  real  world  are  regarded  in  a
similar way to that between an ‘actual entity’ and its ‘reflection’. That is not
to say, as Searle points out, that we do not have access to true reality, rather
that its ‘reflection’ involves a degree of ‘subjectivity’.160
Searle,  indeed,  considers  that  ‘subjectivity’  can  be  divided  into
ontological  and  epistemic  contingency.  In  the  one,  the  phenomenon  is
supposed to depend on the awareness of an individual for its being; in the
other, it is supposed to depend on direct awareness as the ground for its
experience.161 These subjective  categories,  it  seems,  reproduce  intact  the
traditional bifurcation between certain qualities of perception that are given
to  a  perceiver  from  an  irreducible  perspective  and  the  ‘objective’  facts
independent  of  that  ‘subjective’  experience.  The  significant  difference
between  the  traditional  view  and  Searle’s  is  that  Searle  supposes
160 Searle, Rediscovery.
161 Construction of Social Reality, 8-12.
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consciousness  itself  to  be a biological  phenomenon and thus  part  of  the
world  of  objective  facts;  subjectivity  is  a  feature  of  consciousness  in the
same way that auxin is a feature of the biological structure supporting the
execution of photosynthesis in plants.162
My  arguments  in  chapters  two  and  three  are  not  to  deny  that  the
categories  of  experience  include  subjectivity  and objectivity  as  modes  of
knowledge, but rather that the ontological distinction applied by Searle in
his  ‘biological  naturalism’  and  assumed  by  Chalmers,  Nagel  and  the
materialists163 relies  on  a  categorial  separation  of  experience  and  its
corresponding objects that cannot be sustained in any detailed analysis of
perception. Such divisions, including those to which we have also referred,
of  the  nature  of  parthood  are  of  heuristic  value  but  do  not  obtain  in  a
correspondence relation with an object, class, or state of affairs.
As I have, I believe, made sufficiently clear in what has preceded here,
and  throughout  the  rest  of  the  chapters  of  this  essay,  there  are  other
possibilities  available  that  allow  for  the  appearance  in  perception  as  a
simplex that which is composed of many parts without mistaking the nature
162 Rediscovery, 229.
163 I have decided in this work not to go through the minutiae of all the arguments made by analytic 
philosophers of one position or another for or against certain traditional perspectives in the field. To 
have done so would have taken up three quarters of the available space and achieved very little.
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of  the  categories  of  ‘quality’  and  ‘quantity’.  Through  an  examination  of
Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and its existentialia of immanent
absorption  in  the  world  (ek-stasis  in  F,  A,  Capuzzi  and  J.  G.  Gray’s
translation  of  ‘Letter  on  Humanism’)164 and  the  structures  of  language,
psychoanalytic theory, and social interaction it has been possible to produce
the framework to which we have alluded, from which some conclusions can
be drawn.
Due  to  the  multifaceted  nature  of  the  subject,  there  remain  some
concepts yet to be explicitly demonstrated and given exegetical treatment.
Below, I will show how the implications of the conclusions iterated above
can lead, in combination with the notions found in Heideggerian ontology
and linguistic and social structures, it  is  possible to interpret perception
structurally  as  part  of  the  immanent  structures  of  being.  And,  how the
possibility of this fundamental  structure may yield, in a longer study,  a
more general theory of perception encompassing the ‘meaning’ of percepts
and certain aspects of consciousness connected with apperception.
164 Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’ in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi
(London: Routledge, 1978), 141-182.
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i. The immanent meaning of structure.
Certain  notions  have  been  taken  for  granted  until  now,  namely,  the
notion that the way the ‘self’ is constructed influences perception. Many of
the arguments that we have reviewed and made have implied this strongly,
but it has not been examined as a principle in itself. This is partly as a
result  of  the  difficulty  of  doing  so  without  first  having  all  the  concepts
involved available.  Perception  itself,  furthermore,  is  ambiguous.  The
technical use of the term relevant to scientific analysis is not what we are
interested in here, for, as we have seen, this can only supply us with limited
answers  to  the limited  questions  which it  enables  us  to  ask.  Neither  is
asking  a  question  about  ‘meaning’  or  ‘quality’  as  opposed  to  ‘quantity’
meaningful  in  itself  until  the  characteristics  of  these  categories  are
sufficiently understood. 
Furthermore, to ask the question of ‘quality’ from within the hermetic
closure of a purely phenomenological analysis could only present the same
results  that  other  such  analyses,  including  those  of  Husserl,  Heidegger,
Sartre,  and  Merleau-Ponty  have  produced.  They  cannot  uncover  the
ontological status of ‘quality’ as such from within an analytic framework,
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which has already employed the fundamental concepts it wishes to study as
a presupposition for the field itself.
It is, therefore, necessary to include elements that are more objective,
relative  to  the  hermetic  quality  of  the  phenomenological  analysis.  It  is
through this reasoning that the analysis of signs appears to introduce the
possibility  of  interpreting  the  way  in  which  phenomena  come  to  be
represented as a method through which signification and symbolic meaning
can  be  examined  exegetically.  Our  conclusions  governing  the  traditional
‘quantity/quality’ and ‘subjective/objective’ bifurcations precludes the simple
application  of  external  biological  features  in  understanding  qualitative
perception; however, the study of the structure of symbolic relations allows
for  an  examination  of  the  interaction  between  individuals  within  a
structure  of  confinements  and  the  natural  mode  in  which  individuals
encounter the world.
It should be noted, first of all, that whilst the duality of the sign noted by
Saussure  as  a  physical/conceptual  dichotomy  has  been  modified  above
through the linguistic theories of  Vološinov and Bakhtin, and through the
mediation  of  Lacanian  psychoanalysis  and  structural  anthropology,  the
sense in which a sign can imbue multiple varieties of meaning remains. The
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symbolic realm of interaction described in chapter four relies on structures,
which themselves are not basic or simple. The sign contains within it the
meaning of its relations with other signs in the same structure, with the
relation of its structure to other structures, and to the individual who exists
within the nexus of  symbols.  I  do  not  take this  statement  to  be adding
anything  to  the  concepts  of  structure  discussed  in  chapter  four;  it  is
evidenced in Lacan, for instance, when he states: ‘Symbols in fact envelop
the life of man with a network so total that they join together those who are
going  to  engender  him  “by  bone  and  flesh”  before  he  comes  into  the
world; ...’165 To put it in this way is to reduce the word ‘meaning’ to a more
straightforward form than the one implied philosophically. The irreducible
meaning of the phenomenal experience, ‘quality’, cannot be understood if it
is  taken by itself;  it  seems to be possible, and I intend to argue in this
section, that meaning is reducible to the system of signs which comprises it.
In this version, ‘meaning’ is the meaning of signification, of the sign’s
referring to something beyond itself, which I have compared in chapter four
to Vološinov’s use of the word ‘ideology’ as that which ‘reflects and refracts’
another reality beyond itself. If there is a problem with the  Vološinovian
165 Lacan, Speech and Language, 231.
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model of ideology it is in its limitation to certain kinds of phenomena,166
whereas symbols predominate in all relations with the other, and objects in
general.  It  still  requires  a  degree  of  clarification  in  this  form.  Lacan’s
subjective and intersubjective categories, it  could be argued,  can provide
this clarification. Through his three categories  l’imaginaire, le symbolique,
le  réel,  and,  as  I  suggested  in  chapter  three,  Muller’s  additions  to  the
Lacanian  framework,  it  is  possible  to  see  the  formation  of  the  subject
through the imaginary,  its  externalization as the symbolic,  and the real
manifested  as  ‘anxiety’  or  an  imaginary  loss  of  that  which  has  been
bestowed through imaginary relations (l’objet petit a),167 an interpretation
that I have noted previously is supported by Žižek.
The structure of these elements and their signifiers, for Lacan, is the
structure, in essence, of presence and absence. The presence, on the one
hand, of the self-image and everything that it can integrate into itself, and
the absence, on the other, of the real, which can simultaneously refer to that
which  lies  outside  the  domain  of  the  imaginary,  what  Lacan  calls  the
network of signifiers, i.e., symbolic in The Function and Field of Speech in
psychoanalysis, and the contradiction of the new ‘symbolic’ imaginary by the
166 Vološinov, 10.
167 Lacan, Names-of-the-Father, 57-66.
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transposed anxiety of loss.168 Lacan suggests, as an example of the general
pervasiveness  of  what  he  refers  to  as  ‘the  network  of  signifiers’,  that
‘nothing can be grasped, destroyed, or burnt except in a symbolic way’.169 
From the Lacanian/Freudian understanding of  the nature of  self  and
other in their interactions and reactions, it is possible to see a theory of the
constitution of the self as constituted through and within the preexisting
structure  of  signification.  Through the network of  signifiers,  meaning in
action  is  conveyed  to  the  other  as  well  as  to  the  self.  To  the  self,  this
meaning signifies in relation to the supposed fulfillment of desire; to the
other, it signifies through its symbolic relation, through its significance to
them and  to  the  signs  of  the  structure  in  general.  For  this  concluding
chapter, what is of interest is not so much the form of Lacan’s theory as the
notion of structure applied to the structure of the presentation of self. In
this,  everything that  is  presented  is  presented  through the  structure  of
signifiers; correspondence to a signifier is correspondence to a network of
signs whose knowledge only betoken the truth of their relations, not of any
real beyond its  structure.  This  is  supported particularly by J-A. Miller’s
168 The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin Books, 
1994), 48-52.
169 Ibid., 50.
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interpretation  of  Lacan  in  ‘The  Symptom:  Knowledge,  Meaning and the
Real’.170
In relation to the discussion of chapter three on embodied cognition, and
the Heideggerian ontological framework that appears to support better the
phenomenally consistent integration of these disparate functions, it should
be noted that the realm of symbols relies on the immanent percept being
already in evidence. In this sense, I mean to think of perception at its most
basic in the Hegelian sense: ‘the thing is, and it is, merely because it is. It
is’.171 It seems far from clear that such an immediacy ever exists in practice;
like the real, it is that which must in principle be but whose being is never
perceived as the  pure signifier of itself, it is never  for-itself or  in-itself  in
percepion but only exists within the system of interconnected signs,  and
their relations involve Being in general.172
The symbolic structure of language is able to convey meaning by being a
structure, by referring. When ‘quality’ is said to be irreducible, it is because
reduction is a relation to something else,  but more than a relation it is an
170 Jacques-Alain Miller, ‘The Symptom: Knowledge, Meaning and the Real’, trans. Dan Collins, 
Fourteenth Working Days of the Freudian Field, 1997 
<http://www.lacan.com/symptom7_articles/miller.html>.
171 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), 58.
172 My view on this generally algns with Hubert Dreyfus’ paper ‘Heidegger's Critique of the 
Husserl/Searle Account of Intentionality’ (1993) who argues that Heidegger wants to escape the 
notions of intentionality and practice as they relate to a subject/object distinction altogether.
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identification. A sign, however, refers only to itself in its context and to its
relations in its context; scientific analysis from this perspective is also a
context in the sense that the sign’s relation to its simpler components or
causal laws is its relation to another system of signs. An attempt to derive
‘quality’ scientifically in the way that scientific formulae or the diagrams of
Gray’s anatomy and the cellular components they portray are derived, is an
attempt to determine the meaning of one set of signs (‘qualitative’) with a
definition of ‘meaning’ which belongs to a different set of signs. Meaning
always  refers  to  something.  ‘Quality’  is  not  self-referential,  but  it  exists
within  a  phenomenological-social  system  of  signs  whose  ‘meanings’  are
determined  by  their  relations  to  the  other  signs  in  that  system.  I  will
further develop this in the succeeding section, and attempt to show how
‘quality’  can be understood meaningfully without the need for reduction,
and in a way which does not need to cause the empirical scientist constant
anxiety.
In addition to what has been said here, I propose a further interpolation
of the signification of the sign. In order to understand how something can
‘mean’ in the way to which we referred above, it is necessary to understand
the relative connectivity of the sign itself,  and its relation in a nexus of
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other signs to the relative totality of its sphere and the relation of a relative
totality to other signifier networks.  This is how I propose to construct  a
framework within which to  find a  sense for  meaning,  and,  through this
sense, ‘quality’. Ultimately, it is the fluidity of the sign through language,
social  structure,  interaction,  and  familial  relationships  which  are  of
interest. Through these elements, as we have seen from our examination of
Lacan, Muller, Goffman, etc. the individual is inculcated with the symbolic
structure as it exists prior to his coming into it and after his leaving it. They
operate at every level of conscious being, from the unconscious drives, to the
ontological categories of existence, to the normative praxis of Goffman, et al.
I  propose,  therefore,  an  understanding  that  there  are  certain  basic
biochemical structures fundamental to all experience. These are the natural
response mechanisms built-in to the biological organism, such as fight or
flight, the ‘pleasure principle’ as enunciated by Freud (that is the ‘principle’
that develops from the biological precondition for the sensation, etc.) These
are unconscious, not in the sense of psychoanalytical ‘repression’, but in the
sense of lacking the capacity for literal expression, or integration on their
own terms  into  a  symbolic  structure.  However,  these  base  impulses  are
sufficient  only  for  primitive  instinctual  survival.  So  much,  at  least,  is
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ordinary  biological  science.  It  is  the  structures  of  interaction  and  of
language  which  alter  this  awareness  and  give  it  expression.  By  giving
something expression, we mean simply bringing it explicitly to mind. For
this to occur, I suggest it must first exist as a structure outside of the mind;
here, we can adopt Johnson’s notion of the metaphorical extension of basic
schemata into ‘higher-order’  understanding. I  rejected his idea of image-
schemata on account of its neo-Kantianism; however, there is a sense, as E.
Sweetser  suggests,  in  which  language  is  extended  beyond  brute
acknowledgement  of  facts,  grunts  and  gestures,  into  a  fully  articulated
language system by the use of sociophysical metaphor.173
It is, I believe, possible that if there were space to carry it out, a full
study  of  the  metaphorical  and  metonymical  relations  of  words  could
potentially yield a greater understanding of the nature of the relation of the
sign and its concomitant structure. Nevertheless, the essential externality
of the symbol and its interpellation by the individual (Althusser) seems to
be  demonstrated,  first  and  foremost,  in  the  sign’s  relative  universal
appearance, and secondly, in its fundamental character as a self-realization;
that is, in informing the self-image, which, itself is an object relation and
173 Eve E. Sweetser, From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Structure 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 31.
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comes  from  outer,  not  inner,  sense.174 Through  the  process  of  social
interpellation of the signs and their structure,  the individual finds their
primitive instincts sublimated under the structures of symbolic interaction
and affected not simply by the inner modes of direct,  illiterate and non-
conceptual sensation, but through the ‘other’ in the social relation and the
immanent  relations  and  expectations  of  these  interactions.175 Language,
contrary to the perspective of ‘correspondence theory’ is an expression that
forms from the internalization of external structures, and the recognition of
the  most  fundamental  desires.  In  this  recognition,  there  is  an  implied
‘action’, a change in which the perception now has not only the immediate
force of its impression (if such a thing is possible as a discrete interval at
all),  but  the  relation  of  the  response  to  the  impression  to  the  symbolic
structure  that  surrounds  it.  The  question  of  the  inner  relation,  the
instinctual basis, to the structural edifice as a whole drives the sense in
which a sign possesses a ‘quality’. This, I believe, is further evidenced by
reflection on what ‘quality’  is if it is not some meaning, and since we have
determined through the analysis of Lacan and the others that meaning is
174 I take this as evidenced in the psychoanalytic theories of first Freud and then, building on Freud, 
Lacan. In particular, I am thinking of Lacan’s mirror-stage and our modification of it with the more 
recent concepts recorded and developed in Muller’s work.
175 Again, I take the sublimation of base instincts to be an entirely standard reading of the standard texts 
of Freud, i.e., ‘Beyond the “Pleasure Principle”’.
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essentially structured, it seems a reasonable supposition to make to suggest
the ‘quality’ is the internalization of the structure of meaning as it relates
to a sign and its context within a relative totality.
ii. The relation of distributed cognitive systems to 
phenomenological meanings.
In  chapter  three  I  discussed  the  contemporary  notion  ‘embodied
cognition’  developed  in  cognitive  science,  heavily  influenced  by
phenomenological theories. These theories, as I mentioned there, provide an
experimental framework within which to base the view that many of the
essential  functions of consciousness are carried out by quasi-autonomous
subsystems of a wider structure. 
The concept provided by the theories, differing in the aspects noted in
(III) but with a common frame of reference, of embodied cognition proposed
by Varela,  et al., Clark, Lakoff, and Johnson allows for an explanation of
action that is not reliant on any Cartesian or other variant of a centralized
cognitive  processor.  Knowledge,  therefore,  as  was  made  clear  in  chapter
three, is not,  in the sense of an abstract reactive awareness, the driving
force  behind action.  Instead,  reactions to situations are governed by the
sensory and reactive systems that are required in the given circumstances.
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In  this  sense,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  ‘mind’  is  a  collection  of
subsystems whose collective faculties make up the subject. Certainly, in the
structural sense, this would appear to have some force behind it. Apart from
the fact that the difficulty remains of the effect of complex structures such
as social relations, linguistic dialogue, and psychoanalytical categories on
perception and action. From the experimental perspective, it is possible to
determine a set of explanatory minima, which is represented by the notion
of  embodiment.  It  is  not  necessary,  experimentally,  to  extend  analysis
further than the independent functions of embodied cognition; however, it
does not follow naturally from the concept of embodiment that the relations
of  those  systems  should  form  the  whole  sufficient  reason  for  conscious
beings such as exist and with the experiences they engender.176 In Varela, et
al.,for instance, they assume a layered system increasing in its complexity
as  a  function  of  time,  and  repeated  action  and  reaction  scenarios.177
Evolutionary  dynamics,  the  emergence  of  more  complex  properties  from
simpler ones etc.  Varela, et al., state: 
‘In  a  nutshell,  the  enactive  approach  consists  of  two  points:  (1)
perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive
176 Johnson attempts to provide a set of schemata in order to provide an explanation for more complex 
varieties of thought as we noted in chapter three. The flaws of this idea were also discussed there.
177 Varela, et al., 
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structures  emerge  from the  recurrent  sensorimotor  patterns  that
enable action to be perceptually guided.’ 
And so, the conscious self is held in place by its confinement within and
concern for the body.
Firstly,  while it  is  possible for an organism to exist in a system of  a
simpler kind than the one we generally inhabit, it is not precisely clear that
it must be the case that the system as constituted by the structural features
assessed above develops diachronically rather than synchronically.  And, if
these structures inhabit individuals simultaneously, then the question of
what it means to perceive without the symbolic framework, and so without
the  framework  of  linguistic  signs,  becomes  a  question  that  cannot  be
answered. 
They argue, from the experimental perspective that the results of studies
demonstrating the immanent adaptation of the body to its environment and
the  apparent  lack  of  central  cognitive  reason  in  areas  where  bodily
experience has been denied show that ‘perceptually guided action’ means
the distribution of  those processes  over  the body.178 However,  a  symbolic
interpretation could also have been offered of, for instance, the experience of
178 Ibid., 174-5.
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cats  taught  to  be  passive  by  being  perpetually  carried.  In  a  symbolic
version,  the  only  difference  is  that  the  structure  of  their  symbolic
interactions  with  the  environment  is  given  priority.  In  this  case,  the
structural relationship of the cat to its environment has been altered so that
certain faculties are no longer employed.  Both explanations assume that
there  is  no  ‘central  processor’.  In  each  case,  it  is  the  force  of  bodily
experience that informs it, but in the second, the possibility of these effects
being  produced  through  symbolic  systems  of  representation  rather  than
bodily non-cognitive systems is allowed. 
It is not clear that there is a reason based solely on this, to assume that
theirs  is  the  correct  interpretation.  The  accuracy  of  their  experimental
proposals can be sound whilst their interpretation nevertheless neglects to
take into account the complexity of the act of perception.
Secondly,  Varela,  et  al., argue  further  that  there  is  evidence  of
categorization occurring in interaction at the most fundamental level. They
cite Rosch, for instance, who proposed that a basic level of categorization
took place in the ‘taxonomies of concrete objects’. According to Varela, et al.,
categorization is the point at which cognition and the environment become
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‘simultaneously enacted’.179 Following from what we said in the previous
argument, it is not clear from their argument that cognition is enacted in
the  way  that  they  propose  even  if  their  premises  are  accepted.  If,  in
practice,  even  the  infant  behaves  as  if  there  are  basic  categories,  it  is
possible that it does so simply because these categories exist. The infant
performs  many  operations  that  would  be  nearly  impossible  without  the
ability  to  recognize  categories.  That  these  are  functions  of  bodily
interactions  only  demonstrates  that  categories  are  fundamental  to
interaction with the world, it does not follow necessarily that those bodily
interactions are of the kind which Varela, et al., suppose they are.
While Varela,  et al., are influenced strongly by Merleau-Ponty in their
views on bodily  interactions,  I  argued in chapter  three  that Heidegger’s
existentialia  of  Dasein are more useful in the present circumstances than
Merleau-Ponty’s  readily  scientific  phenomenology;  in  the ontic  sense,  his
study is able to accommodate the nature of more specific bodily interaction.
In  his  Structure  of  Behaviour,  he  focuses  primarily  on  a  critique  of  the
scientific position and a development of the ontic relations of organisms. In
our case, however, we are not interested in the detailed, individual ways in
179 Ibid., 176-7.
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which  organism  act  in  the  world.  It  is  the  ontological  status  of  those
organism that is of interest.
Heidegger,  in  Sein  und  Zeit,  through  the  concept  of  fundamental
ontology proposes the idea that for Dasein, or, the ‘being-which-is-there’,180
the  fundamental  state  of  being  is  the  condition  of  Being-in.181 In  the
‘ontological-existential [sic]’ sense, Heidegger suggests that  Dasein’s  sense
of Being in its ‘state-of-mind’ is one, inescapably, of the ‘there’; that is, the
‘thrownness’ of its Being. In the most fundamental sense, the being-there of
Dasein represents an immediate and insuperably pervasive concern that it
is cast into being and must be distinguished from the ‘ontologico-categorial’
sense of Being of the present-at-hand whose being is, in all cases, related to
Dasein. Our claims about the failings of Varela’s, et al., theory can be made
clearer in this light. I suggested that a structural symbolic interactionist
interpretation of the experimental results to which Varela,  et al., referred
would be possible, and, as a result that a different interpretation of the
same experimental information was consistent with the results. By positing
the fundamental state of Being as Being-in and, furthermore, the state-of-
180 The term ‘Dasein’, German for ‘existence’, is not translated by McQuarrie and Robinson, The word 
however represents the concatenation of two German words: ‘There’ (Da) and ‘Being’ (Sein). It has 
been translated by Capuzzi as ‘being-there’. My rendering is not more correct than this, but I wanted 
to emphasize that Dasein is the Being whose essence is to be there. In a sense, Sein und Zeit is 
primarily an attempt to understand thereness as such.
181 Heidegger, Being and Time, §§. 28-30.
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mind of Dasein as ‘thrown’ or experiencing the world through an immediacy
that makes interaction as a being-within-the-world a fundamental and ever
present  existentiale of  Dasein,  Heidegger makes the scientific qualification
of experience attempted by Varela, et al., even more difficult to accomplish.
iii. Conclusions
It  is  possible,  with  what  has  been  outlined  so  far,  to  reach  certain
conclusions about the way in which qualitative perception is formed. Firstly,
it is possible to claim that a distinction between preconceptual and post-
conceptual  perception  is  meaningless.  Such  a  condition  is  hypothetically
plausible; however, perception itself does not retain in its present state, as a
kind  of  record,  an  atomistically  decomposable  set  of  strata.  As  we  have
stressed, and attempted to demonstrate throughout this essay, the ‘image’
always  appears  as  a  simple,  or  collection of  simples.  Heidegger provides
some elaboration on the way that the focus and concern of  Dasein  might
affect these simples, as seen above. When taken together with the structural
notions  developed  in  chapter  four,  it  becomes  clear  that  whilst  these
structures are secondary to the primary, initial form of Being, they affect
from the earliest stages every part of perception. The language, which is
developed so early, and its ‘higher-order’ features could be said to supervene
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on a brute base, but determining precisely what this means, when meaning
is  governed  as  Lacan,  the  linguists,  and  Althusser  point  out  by  the
structures themselves is difficult if not entirely impossible. 
Secondly, the meaning of qualitative perception, so far as it is possible to
determine it at all, is found in the relations of signs, rather than in any kind
of  materialist  or  empirical/experimental  scientific  reduction.  ‘Quality’,
therefore,  can be tentatively defined as the self-relation of the sign in a
context  of  signification.  In  this  sense,  no  ‘quality’  can be  meaningful  in
‘objective’ analysis as an independent object of study. I believe I have shown
above how the sign, in its relations to other signs signifies itself through the
totality of those relations. Any sign, within its own symbolic network, can be
said to signify something in relation firstly,  to  the one to whom it  is  of
concern, and secondly, to the totality of the network of signs. As we noted
above, ‘quality’ would seem to be best described as the relation of the sign to
the individual within the totality of a symbolic structure.
Thirdly, the superstructure of interpellated symbols is efficacious in its
ability to influence the basis of brute sensation. As such, it has a pervasive
and  insuperable  effect  upon  the  ‘original’  understanding  so  that  for  all
intents and purposes that base no longer exists in its original form.
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Appendix A: Lacan and His
Reconceptualization of
Freud
I intend to review here Freud’s psychoanalytic theory alongside Lacan’s,
and to examine his notion of the ‘return to Freud’. I will spend more time
elaborating Freud’s theory than Lacan’s, as I gave more consideration to
expositing Lacan than Freud in the main text of  this  dissertation.  As
such, to answer the question of Freud’s influence on Lacan’s concept of
the  imaginary,  symbolic,  and  real,  it  is  first  necessary  to  relate  the
relevant parts of Freud’s theory. I have made the explanations contained
as brief as I thought could reasonably be accomplished without sacrificing
too much important detail.
i. A brief overview of the Freudian psychical 
architecture.
It has become common knowledge that Freud divided the psyche into
three principal categories: the I (Ego or das Ich), the It (Id or das Es), and
the Over-I (Superego or Über-ich). Freud’s categories applied to psychical
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processes constitute the possible exclusive modalities of 'thoughts’ occurring
within  the  psyche.  That  many  of  the  contents  of  thoughts  consciously
construed are immured within a psychical structure the smallest portion of
which is ‘aware’ of itself, and which may be an unreliable witness to its own
volitional state, is, similarly, uncontested and regarded as uncontroversial.
The  Ego,  as  the  seat  of  a  self-aware  being,  dominates  in  the  Freudian
contest amongst these categories. In the Ego and the Id there is a struggle
between the drives of the id unmediated by the self-interest of the Ego and
the cathectic instincts endemic in the  Ego,  which attempts to incorporate
the unfamiliar object into its own structure through the process of object-
cathexis. It is precisely this process – the longing of the Ego to maintain its
control  over  the  object  --  that  Freud  indicates  to  be  responsible  for  the
conflicts witnessed by psychoanalysts between the repressed manifestations
of  drives  and  the  Ego’s  part  conscious  part  unconscious  drive  towards
repetition and narcissism.182
At the fundament of Freud’s theory of psychological development lies the
‘pleasure-unpleasure [Lust-Unlust] principle, or … the pleasure principle’,183
182 Cf. Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings (Penguin Classics: London, 2003), 
henceforth BPP; 'The Ego and the Id’ in The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay (W. W. Norton and Company: 
New York, 1989), 628-658; The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. James Strachey (Basic Books: New 
York, 1995).
183 ‘Formulations of the Two Principles of Mental Functioning’ in ibid., 301-106 (301).
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the tenet that all psychical energy initially comports itself in such a way as
to  avoid  a  painful  and,  where  possible,  achieve  a  pleasurable  outcome.
Repression is a function of the operation of this principle and forms a part
of the unconscious, primitive stage in the development of the psyche. It is
the  Ego  which  both  influences  and  affects  the  form  of  the  repressed
unconscious by attempting to reconcile its self-image, its pre-conscious or
latent  desires,  with  those  that  would  contradict  and,  thereby,  limit  its
perceived capabilities, and which is influenced and affected by it. According
to Freud, antithesis should therefore be posited between the ‘coherent ego
and the repressed’, not the conscious and unconscious.184
This dual role of activity and passivity is played out more than once.
Initially, it occurs internally as a consequence of biological, innate drives
and the burgeoning consciousness system of the  Ego, and then again with
regard to the brute force of the external object and the  Ego’s instinctive
appropriation of its perceived power. But to achieve its aim the Ego must re-
enact or repeat constantly the object that is outside of its sphere of direct
control,185 and in so doing, accommodate its elements of independence as a
characteristic of the Ego’s will. In its encounter with the real, the external
184 BPP, 56-7.
185 Claude Levi-Strauss also observes this phenomenon as one of the principal constituents in the 
“medical” practice/ritual of shamanism (Levi-Strauss, 1963: 186-206).                                   
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object, the Ego must develop a new ‘reality principle’ to maintain its prior
commitment  to  the  ‘pleasure  principle’,  which,  although  it  can  now  be
delayed or forestalled, nevertheless remains the basis for the formation of
cathexes.186
Freud evidences his theory of repetition in Beyond the Pleasure Principle
(BPP) with the  example  of  a  child  re-enacting  the  disappearance  of  his
mother by playing a game (‘Fort/Da’) the object of which is to cast his toys
far away and declare in rudimentary terms that they are ‘gone’. According
to  Freud’s  assessment  of  the  child’s  behaviour,  it  constitutes  a
representation of his mother’s disappearance and reappearance – a state of
affairs over which he has no control. By this performative re-enactment the
child converts his passive role into an active one.187 Freud notes: ‘by this
being  active  he  gains  far  more  thorough-going  control  of  the  relevant
powerful  experience  than  was  possible  when  he  was  merely  its  passive
recipient.’188 
Whilst  the  child’s  play  is  susceptible  of  straightforward  interpolation
into  the Freudian hypothesis  that the drives of  the  Ego  (Ichtrieben) are
186 Although we say, ‘prior commitment’, it should be understood that Freud regards the ‘reality 
principle’ as possibly more fundamental than the pleasure principle. It is, as is explained below, a point 
of contention between Freud and Lacan. It is, even under the Freudian auspices, a prior commitment in 
the sense that the reaction to it is only concomitant if the ‘pleasure principle’ is presupposed.
187 BPP, 53.
188 Ibid., 74.
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principally structured for the satisfaction of the pleasure principle through
the mediation of the reality principle, Freud notices a pattern of behaviour
in traumatic neuroses that defies such an explanation. In this case, he finds
that  the  only  possible  result  of  the  repetition  of  trauma  is  unpleasure,
therefore it appears at first to defy that principle altogether. To integrate
the  phenomenon  of  traumatic  repetition  into  his  general  theory  of  the
psyche, Freud needs to reconceive his notion of how the drives function in
relation to each other, and how they relate to the tendency to satisfy the
pleasure  principle.  As  a  prerequisite  to  the  reimagining  the  features  of
psychical construction, he first reassesses his theory cathexis formation.
Investment  of  mental  energy  (cathexis)  is  (re)-distributed,  Freud
suggests,  according  to  the  requirement  to  ‘annex’  certain  events  whose
impacts would otherwise present symptomatically as traumatic. He adopts
a  distinction  by  Josef  Breuer  between  two  varieties  of  cathexes,  a  free-
flowing variety that is able to realign itself to accommodate an incoming
stimulus  and  a  ‘quiescent’  variety  that  attaches  itself  to  the  stimulus.
Cathectic  realignment  acts  in  this  way  as  a  defence  against  the
consciousness system being overwhelmed by its stimuli. Freud speculates
that traumatic neuroses occur when there is a failure to annex an event
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leading to the ‘compulsion’ to repeat the event symbolically. The desire to
repeat the traumatic event he supposes to be evidence against the idea that
all drives tend towards satisfaction of the pleasure principle. The result of
this, for the sake of preserving space, is the death drive. It is the fatalistic
attitude  of  all  organisms  in  regard  to  their  existence  (Ichtrieben)  in  an
environment  where  death  must  come,  and  the  need  conditioned  by  the
sexual  drives  (Sexualtrieben)  to  seek  death  in  their  own way:  ‘The  fact
remains that the organism wants only to die in its own particular way; and
so these guardians of life, too, were originally myrmidons of death.’189
Before addressing Lacan’s ‘return to Freud’  and the way in which he
attempts to reinterpret the Freudian psyche by employing concepts from
sociology and structural linguistics, it is first necessary to understand the
appropriate  place  of  the  death  drives  within  Freud’s  overall  structure.
Crucial to Lacan’s theories is the retention of much – including the death
drive  and  libido  theory  –  that  other  psychoanalysts,  such  as  W.  D.
Winnicott,  Ferenczi,  Jung,  &c.,  have  tended  either  to  minimalize  or
eliminate. The difficulties of interpretation arise from two principal sources,
firstly from the ambiguity of the development of his theses, and secondly
189 Ibid., 79; I will not expend more time on a description of the death drive as this seems superfluous in
the present context. Freud’s justification of the existence of the death drive and their antithesis to the 
sexual drive can be found at length in §§. VI-VII of ‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’.
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from the highly speculative character of his discussion in sections IV, V and
VI of  BPP. In the former case, Freud develops his theory gradually over a
great period of time but does not explicitly eliminate outmoded elements of
his psychoanalytic concepts, as Raluca Soreanu notes.190 In the latter, Freud
himself  acknowledges  the  speculative  nature  of  his  project.  Much  of  it,
indeed, suffers from a lack of direct verifiability, for instance, his attempts
to trace the two primary categories of drive (Sexualtrieben and Ichtrieben)
to the historical protozoic stage of life or his treatment of the movement and
‘transformation’  of  cathectic  energy  as  a  quantifiably  nomological
phenomenon. 
The  death  drive  and  its  functioning  within  the  Freudian  psychical
structure is particularly apt for misconstruction. It relies on a revision of
Freud’s  previous  understanding  of  concepts  that  after  his  1920  essay
acquire  broader  metapsychological  and,  in  Lacan’s  hands,  metaphysical
signification. The motivation behind the concept of the death drive is, on the
one hand, simple: it is the  Ego,  deprived of its sublimation to some other
drive (i.e,  the  life  drives)  bringing forward its  inevitable termination.  In
trauma, Freud suggests that it is the interruption of the process of the other
190  Raluca Soreanu, ‘Something Was Lost in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle: A Ferenczian 
Reading’, American Journal of Psychoanalysis 77 (2017), 223-238.
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drives, so giving the Ego drives their free reign, which produces the effect of
endless repetition. On the other hand, his theory of the death drive is highly
complex,  drawing on thinkers  such as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer,  and
relying on a nuanced understanding of the totality of interrelations of the
multi-faceted  unconscious.  It  involves,  as  I  intend  to  show  below,  an
appreciation of the ontological difference; that is, between the ontic and the
ontological, between that which pertains to specific instances of a category
and the category itself.191 
Taken  as  it  is  presented  in  BPP,  an  analysis  of  the  libido  theory’s
normative  qualities  appears  to  suggest  several  inadequacies.  Its
identification  of  libido  with  ‘life’  drives  has  been  criticized  as  overly
reductive and focussing monomaniacally on the ‘erotic’ drives, evidence for
which  can  be  seen  in  The  Ego  and  the  Id  wherein  Freud  specifically
identifies the ‘erotic component’ as an offset for the death drive.192 Freud’s
emphasis  of  the  death  drive,  and  its  sole  claim on  the  phenomenon  of
neurotic  repetition,  over  the  self-preservation  drives  and  their  exclusion
from the Ego being taken over entirely by the sexual drives.  His scientific
191 This takes an Heideggerian view rather than an Aristotelian/Platonic (Particular/Universal) view as 
the categories involved are fundamentally related to modes of Being.
192 The Ego and The Id, 655; for criticisms cf. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl and Faith Bethelard, ’The 
Hidden History of the Ego Instincts’, Psychoanalytic Review 86 (1999), 822-851 (841), Soreanu, Op. 
Cit., Henry F. Ellenberger, The Discovery of the Unconscious (Fontana Press: London, 1994), 418-570.
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methodology, as noted above, is questionable – though it is not necessarily
fatal to his theory since evidence can be discovered beyond its biological
facets and it does not depend thereupon for its veracity.
As the intention here is to present a correct general understanding of
the place of the death drives and not to defend Freud against his detractors,
I  will  only respond to the charges against  him so far as is  necessary to
demonstrate this.  Freud’s  apparent reduction of  all  motivation to sexual
impulses has been widely criticised from numerous sources. As  Soreanu
points out, there is the general sense in which Έρ́ως becomes the metaphor
for  the  sexual  drives,  ignoring  the  tripartite  division  of  the  Greek
understand of  love  including  γάπ́ήἀ  (familial)  and  φιλιά́  (friendship).193
However,  there  is,  possibly,  in  these  critiques  of  Freud  a  common
misunderstand: a tendency to confound the vulgar/social understanding of
Έρ́ως and the biological/categorial. In the former case, it stands opposed in
a social nexus to γάπ́ήἀ  and φιλιά́ replete with symbolism imposed upon it
by the structure it inhabits; in the latter, it is both a biological category (the
’life’ or   ’reproductive’ drive) and a mode of Being (life reproducing its own
conditions of existence). In any case, a distinction can be drawn between the
193 Soreanu, 227-228.
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basis, the biological substratum denuded of its symbolic mediation, and the
superstructure of the social – in this case, the terms are convenient for their
etymology rather than their philosophical attachment to Marxist thought.
The tendency to ascribe all human behaviour to two primary motivations
may well be Freud’s mistake as much as his interpreters, but it is possible
to see how all  motivations can flow from one (compound) source and yet
become far more complex and diverse in their everyday manifestations. It
takes little thought to imagine, for instance, how complex social relations
such as the ceremonies surrounding romantic love and funeral practices can
be  associated  with  less  complex  drives  which,  deprived  of  sociological
stimulation, would adopt a much less nuanced form of expression.
ii. Lacan’s adoption of Freud and his conceptualization of
the categories of the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real.
The kernel, though not the extraneous substance, of these observations
is  supported  by  Lacan’s  interpretation  of  Freudian  psychoanalysis.  It  is
precisely such an attempt to situate Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts within
the  framework  of,  then,  contemporary  sociological  and  linguistic
‘discoveries’  and defend Freud against  those whose attempts to  preserve
psychoanalytic theory against its critics led to the abandonment of what
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Lacan sees as crucial elements of his theory. It is not necessary to go much
further in assessing this aspect, as much has already been said about in the
main text of my dissertation. However, I will comment on the significant
influence of  BPP on Lacan’s thinking and the relation of his categories of
the self (imaginary, symbolic, real) to Freud’s tripartite conceptualization of
the psyche.
Although he adopts his ideas from Freud speaking of a ‘return to Freud’,
Lacan  treats  his  notions  differently.  The  biological  substrate  and
mechanistic reasoning that Freud employs to demonstrate the validity of
his hypotheses are lost in favour of an understanding of the real which is
relative and structural. Relative in the sense that it is never ‘brute’ reality,
an absolutely real basis. Structural in the sense that it is  structure  which
gives  it  meaning  and,  thereby,  makes  it  more  than  nothing.194 It  is  the
objectivism inherent in Freud’s account of the death drive with which Lacan
takes  issue.195 In  Lacan’s  account,  it  is  the  relation  between  signs,  the
structure  itself,  not  its  empirical  basis,  which  gives  rise  to  the
fundamentally traumatic character of the real. The conflict here, is between
194 Cf. Reality Principle; 'The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud’, in 
Écrits, 334-363.
195 Andrea Hurst, Derrida vis-a-vis Lacan: interweaving deconstruction and psychoanalysis (New York:
Fordham University Press, 2008), 214.
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the real as unrealizable other, and the imaginary, which presents the self as
an object for itself (the Ego). 
Whilst  there  remains  such  a  thing as  empirical  reality  the  principal
effect of Lacan’s notion is that the absolute ground can never be attained;
experience  will  appear  only  as  structure  whose  signs  appear  already
interpolated. It is in the symbolic realm of the sign that psychic life takes
place, according to Lacan. In essence, it is the inter-subjective realm; the
gaze-induced imaginary, that which sees itself as an object, and the real,
which threatens to annihilate that self, account only for the individual. The
symbolic  represents  the  social  nexus  surrounding  these  categories.  The
world  of  unconscious  representations  as  they  appear  in  the  only  reality
which is accessible.
The categories of the imaginary, the symbolic,  and the real avoid the
biological reductivism of Freud’s theory by placing the psychical structure
outside of the individual and, therefore, beyond the biological constitution of
the human being.  Though it is not removed entirely from it, its structure is
no  longer  reducible  to  straightforward  components.  While  the  charge  of
over-reduction to sexual drives might still be leveled at Lacan, it is possible
147
to view these in terms of generalized primitive forces rather than its use in
the normative (vulgar/biological) way.
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